Voices from the Arab press: Damascus between the Druze, Alawites, and Kurds

These crises, both current and looming, were to be expected. While there is widespread domestic consensus on the removal of Assad, the new regime will need time to build trust and legitimacy. It operates in a volatile regional environment, one that includes players unsettled by this shift – players who will need time to observe, accept, and engage with the new order.

Among the internal conflicts simmering across Syria, two factions pose the greatest threat to stability. The first is overtly hostile: remnants of the old regime, Iranian-backed elements, and local criminal networks such as drug cartels. These groups will continue to sow discord, aiming to fragment Syria, entrap Damascus in a drawn-out conflict, and encourage the splintering of the nation into autonomous enclaves.

The second group emerges from within the regime itself or considers itself its rightful heir. It plays an active role in stoking crises and harbors its own vision for governing Syria and managing foreign relations. This so-called loyalist camp is no less dangerous than external enemies; it deepens internal fractures and provokes conflict, ultimately tempting the government to confront the broader regional order and inviting foreign powers to manipulate an internal civil war for their own gain.

Navigating these land mines will demand wisdom and restraint, lest the regime be distracted from the far more arduous task of constructing a viable state – one that can deliver the basics that Syrians are desperate for, including better living standards and a genuine transition toward modern governance.

Sharaa’s administration enjoys a degree of domestic support, but that goodwill is vulnerable to erosion amid impending crises: bread shortages, inflation, stagnant wages, and the sluggish arrival of foreign aid. These are not problems caused by Tehran or Assad loyalists; they are structural challenges that must be met head-on.

Compounding the urgency is the need to deescalate simmering societal tensions that threaten to blossom into civil war. Whether under the banner of freedom, defense of the old regime, or resistance to both, certain actors are working to inflame the fears and divisions of a population already frayed by years of trauma.

The international community is looking for a civil state governed by disciplined security and military apparatus. For its part, the new regime in Damascus needs time to consolidate power and gain the confidence of Syria’s diverse constituencies. Let us not forget: while Hafez Assad styled himself as the protector of minorities, he also surrounded himself with figures like Abdul Halim Khaddam and Mustafa Tlass to project a veneer of balance.

Elsewhere in the region, efforts to erect extremist regimes have failed, and Syria has no intention of becoming another Gaza or Afghanistan. Upon his arrival in the capital, Sharaa made clear that his vision was one of national focus and inclusivity, not international entanglement. His administration demonstrated a surprising moderation and pragmatic approach to diplomacy that aligned with its commitments.

Syria will not be a fading replica of Iran, nor will it serve as a proxy in wars against Israel or Iran, nor should it allow foreign conflicts to spill over onto its soil. Even amid this complex web of ethnic, sectarian, and regional tensions, the road ahead will remain treacherous.

The regime inherits a nation battered by domestic upheaval and foreign interference alike. Steering it toward stability will demand not brute force but political finesse and a sixth sense for sensing and neutralizing crises before they erupt.

Russia’s posture during the conflict was notably tepid, prompting questions about the reliability of its support for Iran in moments of genuine crisis. The debate has also extended to include China, with analysts and officials concluding that neither power has risen to the level expected of a true strategic ally.

That said, these reflections have not translated into calls to sever ties. On the contrary, Iran continues to value its relationships with both countries, recognizing the benefits they offer: economic, diplomatic, and occasionally military.

Still, the war laid bare the degree of isolation Iran faces on the global stage, despite its ongoing efforts to portray itself as an active player with diverse alliances.

Yet, these moves reflect mutual interest more than principled support – win-win diplomacy rather than an ironclad strategic pact. The trilateral relationship among Iran, Russia, and China is underpinned by a shared desire to advance a multi-polar world order, one that can counterbalance what they view as Western hegemony.

Iran, in particular, is attempting to reposition itself within this emerging multilateral system. The three nations have stepped up military, technological, and intelligence collaboration, filling in gaps in one another’s capabilities.

But this isn’t the first time Iran has wrestled with doubts about its ties to Russia. There has long been internal skepticism regarding Russia’s willingness to meaningfully enhance Iran’s military capabilities or influence Tehran’s complex relationship with the West.

Two schools of thought dominate the internal discourse: one believes that despite Russia’s shortcomings, the alliance is essential for resisting Western pressure; the other contends that Moscow is likely to abandon Tehran should it serve Russia’s broader interests, particularly in negotiations with the West.

While both governments have frequently touted their strategic agreements, defense coordination, and geopolitical alignment – especially in the face of US sanctions and Iran’s increasing diplomatic isolation – Moscow’s ambiguous stance during the Israel-Iran conflict was perceived by many in Tehran as a glaring act of indifference, delay, and double-dealing.

Critics within Iran argue that national security and military advancement should not be tethered to the shifting political calculus of foreign powers. This realization is pushing a reevaluation of what Iran defines as its national interest, particularly given that the Moscow relationship has, in some instances, hindered rather than helped the development of critical domestic military industries.

Russia’s duplicitous approach appears to prioritize cultivating ties with more powerful states such as China, India, and even the US over establishing a genuine partnership with Iran.

For Tehran, this is evident in Russia’s major arms sales to India at a time when Iran urgently needs to replenish its own air defenses, especially after Israeli airstrikes exposed their vulnerability.

While Iran is now exploring upgrades to its air defense system, there is renewed interest in Chinese technologies, which have already been provided to Pakistan during its tensions with India, unlike Russia’s selective hesitancy.

Other issues, including delays in power plant construction, foot-dragging on arms deals, and a lack of engagement on regional matters like Syria and the Caucasus, have only intensified Iranian doubts. As a result, there is renewed momentum behind calls for a revival of the “neither East nor West” doctrine, a principle rooted in post-revolutionary foreign policy.

Even so, Tehran remains fully aware that, despite Russian unreliability, the US and the broader West continue to pose the greatest threat to its regime. It also understands that both Moscow and Beijing are prepared to use Iran as leverage in their broader confrontations with the West – especially under the Trump administration – and are unlikely to stand by Iran in the event of a direct war with the US.

Nevertheless, Iran recognizes that working with these powers is still preferable to facing isolation in a hostile world.

Current visions and approaches between the US administration and the Israeli government on key regional issues diverge significantly, shaped by each side’s respective priorities.

At the core of the dispute are differing assessments and strategies regarding how to deal with Iran’s behavior and ambitions. Both the US and Israel recognize that key aspects of the conflict remain shrouded in secrecy, particularly concerning the extent of damage inflicted on Iranian capabilities during the strikes.

Israel believes that rapid, multifaceted responses are essential and opposes relying solely on a diplomatic track. In contrast, the US is leaning into an approach grounded in strategic dialogue, carefully observing Iran’s response to American overtures and gauging the potential for negotiated resolution. This is particularly salient given Tehran’s long-standing tactic of dragging out talks, a delay that Washington fears could bring Iran to the nuclear threshold, a scenario that Israel considers unacceptable.

Israel, therefore, rejects the US approach in both form and substance. It sees the path to resolution not through diplomacy, but through force, using military pressure to compel Iran back to the negotiating table.

However, Israel is also acutely aware of the risks involved. A force-based strategy could come at a high price, triggering severe security blowback at home, especially if full-scale escalation occurs.

Meanwhile, the situation in Gaza remains fraught, with the US administration pushing for a final peace agreement in the Strip, championed by key officials like envoy Steve Witkoff and hostage negotiator Adam Boehler.

Yet, despite American pressure, the Israeli government remains cautious and opaque about its intentions. Even if Israel agrees to enter negotiations, it is expected to favor a gradual, interim arrangement rather than a comprehensive resolution.

Israeli officials are deeply skeptical of any agreement that leaves Hamas in the picture – directly or indirectly – and are wary of Washington’s apparent willingness to tolerate Hamas’s continued presence, even temporarily, in Gaza’s political and military landscape.

This point of contention has spurred the Israeli government to explore alternative governance models, including elevating clan leaders and local figures opposed to Hamas, reinforcing the view that the disagreement will persist as a focal point of political and security friction between the two allies.

Still, despite these tensions, the American administration and the Israeli government are expected to maintain a working relationship – at least superficially – while quietly pursuing Israel’s strategic goals in ways that avoid direct confrontation with Washington.

At the end of that confrontation, Trump announced a ceasefire in what he described as a no-win, no-vanquish scenario, declaring that the objectives had been met from his administration’s perspective.

According to Global Firepower, a leading source on military capabilities, the Russian military ranks as the second most powerful in the world, following only the US. This assessment is based on more than 60 metrics, including manpower, economic strength, logistics, technological development, and geographic advantages.

Putin’s core miscalculation lies in having fallen into what I believe to be an American trap – an open-ended war of attrition that steadily drains Russian resources and capabilities. Yet he persists, committed to a campaign that shows no clear exit strategy. The inherent danger of war is that while its onset is often determined by those who initiate it, its conclusion is far less predictable and almost always beyond their control.