The October 7 war, sometimes called Swords of Iron, has put Israel’s public relations (PR) efforts under intense global scrutiny. Protests, accusations of genocide, and negative media coverage have highlighted severe challenges.
On May 15, 2024, the Misgav Institute for Public Diplomacy and Zionist Strategy, a think tank promoting pragmatic and realistic approaches in Israeli foreign and defense policy, hosted a webinar titled “How to Improve Israel’s Public Diplomacy.” The panel, moderated by Misgav senior fellow Lahav Harkov, featured former government spokespersons Eylon Levy and Lt.-Col. (res.) Jonathan Conricus, and Matt Krieger, founder and CEO of Gova 10 Communications and chief communications officer of Bring Hersh Home – a campaign for Hersh Goldberg-Polin, 23, who is still being held in Hamas captivity.
Israel’s public diplomacy was caught unprepared despite the stark nature of the October 7 attack, lacking the necessary civilian-level infrastructure for effective public diplomacy. As Levy explained, “The whole public diplomacy operation was something that was set up and built on the fly. This tells us the best and worst of Israel. The best is that Israel, in times of emergency, knows to be flexible, agile, and creative, giving young people responsibility and sending them into battle. The worst is that this isn’t the way this should work. We should have started this war with a professional press team at the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) able to answer journalists’ questions. There should have been a core team, which could have been supplemented as needed. This didn’t exist.”
Where Israel's public diplomacy went wrong in the Israel-Hamas War
At the onset of the war, according to Levy, Israel did not have a dedicated foreign media spokesperson, and the existing system relied heavily on volunteers rather than professional, full-time spokespeople proficient in multiple languages. Israel’s public communications is rather driven by the military, specifically the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit under Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, giving the country a “martial law” feel. Journalists seeking government comments were often directed to a single person, who was understaffed and supported by volunteers who had put their lives on hold to assist in the war effort. The Public Affairs Directorate, originally founded after the Second Lebanon War to deal with ineffective communications, focused more on internal communication within Israel, particularly at the beginning of the conflict.
While the civilian side was largely improvised, filled with volunteers and heavily understaffed, the IDF had improved its ability to respond to external PR communication. “The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit has been doing a lot of things right and has improved its capacity to communicate with the international media many times over,” Conricus said “The Al Ahli Hospital, UNRWA, Al Shifa Hospital — all these situations saw international media being prioritized, with Admiral Hagari speaking in English and really putting international media front and center. We have seen multiple cases where international media were given access to breaking news that Israeli media didn’t get.”
Conricus pointed out that while there were good examples of crisis communication, there was a missing strategy: “What I think is missing at the big strategic level is for the State of Israel to recognize that international media PR, international public relations, and public affairs are strategic enablers. If we don’t do it right, we are shooting ourselves in the foot and limiting our ability to operate and pursue our strategic goals.”
Krieger highlighted a similar issue within civil society. Even the highly effective Hostage and Missing Families Forum, representing hostage families from October 7, is filled with volunteers who, while highly motivated, were not as effective as trained professionals. Additionally, messaging is not unified, with each family expressing their message differently, and strong differences between the government and the forum.
“Everyone [on a political level] is posturing,” Krieger noted, pointing out the complexities of negotiating for hostages while maintaining a strong position. He acknowledged the difficult position the government was in, needing to show strength, fight a war, bring home hostages, negotiate with terrorists, and placate the Americans, often causing the hostage situation to fall through the cracks.
Achieving effective public diplomacy requires creating a structured framework, which is currently lacking. Conricus proposed several solutions to address this issue:
- Funded and directed national public relations entity: There needs to be a dedicated entity with clear guidance and budgets for communications, focusing on Israeli, Arab, and international audiences. This entity should include a team of professionals skilled in strategy, visual imagery, social media, fact-checking, and open-source intelligence.
- Fact-checking and intelligence team: A dedicated team should be established to verify information quickly and counteract misinformation which is spread by Hamas and other enemies. Currently, the delay in responding to false narratives allows significant PR damage.
- Improved visual capabilities: Israel needs specialized units to collect and disseminate visual content effectively. Combat camera units from adversaries like Hamas and Hezbollah often outperform Israel’s in this regard.
Despite the current improvisation, there have been successes within the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit that could inform the establishment of a civilian unit. Conricus mentioned that the IDF has prioritized foreign media, often giving international outlets access to breaking news before local reporters. Additionally, senior officials from the military have reacted correctly in times of crisis communications. For instance, during the World Central Kitchen (WCK) situation, which Conricus labeled as the “mother of all crisis communications,” the chief of staff of the IDF issued a statement in English at 2 a.m., prioritizing foreign media. “This is exactly the kind of media we need, where international media need to be front and center to preserve Israeli legitimacy to fight our very legitimate battle.”
Levy agreed about the need for a new entity, emphasizing the reliance on volunteers during the war. He highlighted the necessity for trained spokespeople supported by a professional infrastructure. Since leaving his post, Levy has initiated a popular podcast, State of the Nation, supported by Diaspora Minister Amichai Chikli, to provide Diaspora influencers with accurate information.
Krieger stressed the importance of cultivating quality relationships with media professionals rather than treating interactions as transactional. “We need to cultivate relationships with key journalists and others who need to tell our story,” Krieger said, emphasizing the need to identify key outlets and audiences and ensure that journalists tell the story from Israel’s perspective.
No discussion on Israel’s PR challenges is complete without considering the political dimension. Harkov, the moderator during the webinar’s question period, argued that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political priorities and personality may have contributed to the lack of urgency in establishing a robust public diplomacy framework.
“When Netanyahu came into office in 2022, he left several roles open, including the role to coordinate hostage negotiations. Now we have someone, but there was no consul general in New York. He didn’t think it was important to do that right away... and he never really prioritized any of these things,” Harkov said. Netanyahu’s historic distrust of the Foreign Ministry and his strong communication skills in English might have further complicated the situation.
Additionally, as Krieger pointed out, there has been a situation with two foreign ministers since October 7 who do not speak English as a native language. “The Foreign Ministry is the face of the country and should be right there.…so if they cannot communicate at a high level in English, at least they should have staff that can communicate.”
Adding to the lack of proficient English ability at the government level is internal miscommunication. The same week that Levy was suspended and then fired as government spokesperson, Netanyahu complained to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that he “couldn’t find one person who could put two words together in English.” According to Eylon, apparently no one had informed Netanyahu at this point of Levy’s suspension, nor was he fully aware of the situation, despite Levy’s working in the Prime Minister’s Office as a spokesperson.
Conricus summarized the dilemma as a lack of political will, noting that Israel’s PR is not a national priority. “It needs to be a structured effort with money, effort, and personnel,” he said, suggesting that the situation might need to deteriorate further before politicians recognize the importance of effective public diplomacy.
“Unfortunately, national public relations is not a national [political] priority. It is a pastime, it is a one-man show. In some cases, it is a no man’s show. It needs to be a structured entity with money, effort, personnel….To be pessimistic, the situation may not be bad enough yet for this to happen. Maybe we still need to go through an American arms embargo or them squeezing an end of the war without a Hamas defeat for politicians to realize that there is a direct link between our quality of public relations and our ability to pursue our strategic goals.”
All the speakers brought up important elements highlighting Israel’s PR challenges and bringing clues toward effective solutions. Despite the current mishaps on a public civilian level, effective public diplomacy is crucial for a nation’s strategic interests, especially for a country like Israel that faces unique geopolitical challenges. Public diplomacy not only shapes international perception but also influences a country’s ability to operate on the global stage. For Israel, whose security and strategic decisions are closely watched by the international community, having a robust public diplomacy framework is not a luxury but a necessity.
To achieve this, Israel must transition from an ad-hoc, volunteer-driven approach to a more institutionalized and professional system. This involves not just responding to crises but proactively shaping narratives and building relationships with international media. By doing so, Israel would be able to better manage its international image, counter misinformation, and garner support for its policies and actions.
Israel’s public diplomacy faces significant challenges exacerbated by a lack of preparation, inadequate infrastructure, and political inertia. Establishing a dedicated, professional entity for public diplomacy, improving fact-checking and visual capabilities, and fostering quality relationships with media professionals are crucial steps toward enhancing Israel’s image and supporting its strategic goals. The political dimension, particularly the priorities and perceptions of leadership, plays a critical role in these efforts. Effective public diplomacy is not merely a tactical necessity but a strategic enabler essential for Israel’s long-term security and international relations.■