The decision by two powerful Iran-backed Shi’ite militias in Iraq to disarm and hand over their weapons to state control has been welcomed by US and other Western officials.
The two militias are the powerful Asaib Ahl al-Haq organization, headed by Qais al-Khazali, and the Ktaeb Imam Ali group, helmed by Shibl al-Zaidi. Asaib announced that it has formed a committee to manage all aspects of the handover and to draw up an inventory of the group's weapons.
A statement from Ktaeb Imam Ali, meanwhile, asserted that the move was made “out of national responsibility, to preserve the gains of victory, and to strengthen national unity.”
In response to the announcements, Tom Barrack, the US Special Envoy for Syria and Iraq, wrote on X/Twitter that he extends his “congratulations to Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaidi on this significant step forward, which represents the nascent foundation for a renewed Iraqi self-governance – grounded in restored sovereignty, enduring stability, and the promise of national renewal.
“We likewise commend those groups whose principled decision to return all weapons to the Iraqi state will contribute to the architecture of order.”
The move by these two groups follows a decision a week earlier by Moqtada al-Sadr, a Shi’ite cleric and leader of the Saraya al-Salam militia, to similarly integrate his group’s armed capacity into the state’s military forces. Sadr, unlike Khazali and Zaidi, is not a direct client/proxy of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
So what is going on? Are we witnessing the unprecedented sight of an Iran-supported militia structure willingly disbanding itself in the interest of national unity and good governance? Do miracles still happen?
Adjustment, consolidation of Iraq's 'deep state'
The picture, unsurprisingly, is rather more complex. This is not the ceding of Iran’s “deep state” within the Iraqi system, but rather its adjustment and consolidation.
The key figure to observe in the current trajectory is Faiq Zaidan, someone little known outside of Iraq. He serves as chief of Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council. Zaidan, a close associate of Khazali, is widely seen as Iraq’s “kingmaker.”
Iraqi journalist Ali Mahmoud, writing for the Middle East Forum earlier this month, noted: “Since 2018, no prime ministerial candidate has moved forward without [Zaidan’s] consultation, approval, or intervention.”
This influence was clearly acknowledged when Barrack visited Zaidan on April 19, in the context of the US determination to prevent the return of the Iran-linked Nouri al-Maliki to the premiership of Iraq.
The US efforts succeeded, against the background of threats to withhold access to Iraqi dollar accounts. As Mahmoud wrote, “Barrack placed his weight behind Zaidan, just as Iranian Quds Force chief Esmail Qaani did before him, and each left the man facing a clear test. The American wants a prime minister who changes course.”
What followed was the appointment of 40-year-old businessman Ali al-Zaidi as prime minister, and then the announcements by Asaib and Ktaeb Imam Ali.
But a closer look at Zaidan – the power broker with whom the US is now allying in Iraq – reveals that he is an element within the Iran-led power structure in Iraq, not its opponent.
A detailed December 2023 study by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point identified Zaidan as one of the nodes of the Iranian system in Iraq. The study focuses on the period following the Iran-aligned muqawama (resistance) factions’ electoral defeat in 2021. At that time, anti-Iranian forces seemed to have a real chance of forming a government.
But, according to the CTC study, “The most important tool in the muqawama’s 2022 turnaround was Iraq’s most senior judge, the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Court’s Judge Faiq Zaidan, who (in February 2022) suddenly (and very unusually during a tense government formation interregnum) issued a flurry of rulings in his subordinate Supreme Federal Court (FSC) that all, in some way, proved highly damaging to the tripartite bloc’s effort to form a government without the muqawama factions.”
Zaidan’s efforts at that time were not merely decorative. Most significantly, his court “altered the government formation rules so that the tripartite bloc’s simple [165-seat] majority was no longer sufficient to form a government and instead a two-thirds [218-seat] majority was needed.” This made it impossible for a government to be formed without the pro-Iran militias’ involvement.
Zaidan remained in close contact with IRGC, terror groups
The CTC study characterizes Zaidan’s career trajectory in the following terms: “Based on an extensive multi-year investigation, Zaidan is one of a number of judges groomed by the Iraqi muqawama, specifically by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis since around 2004. Zaidan was maneuvered by Muhandis to the apex of the Iraqi judicial system, whereupon Muhandis privately referred to him as ‘the guardian of the Shia project.’… Zaidan remained in close contact with IRGC-QF officials and US-designated foreign terrorist organizations such as KH and AAH throughout 2021-2022 on the government formation issue.”
Muhandis, it should be recalled, was the IRGC’s key man in Iraq. He was killed in January 2020 alongside his patron, Qassem Soleimani, by a US missile on the road from Baghdad airport.
From 2021 to 2022, Zaidan and his colleagues' efforts were successful. Their rivals failed to form a government, paving the way for the return of the pro-Iran element to power with the formation of the Mohammed al-Sudani government in October 2022.
Today, Zaidan has, according to one Iraqi political website, “stepped into the role once played by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis… running the political scene from behind the curtain.” This is the man that the US government is aligning with in order to curb Iranian influence in Iraq.
The point is not that Iran is conducting an entirely fraudulent show of rivalry between different political camps among its allies and clients in Iraq.
This competition for power between the different factions is real. Zaidan and Khazali’s network is opposed to Maliki’s, and vice versa. It should not be assumed that the opposition to Maliki represents opposition per se to Iranian interests in Iraq. It does not. Rather, what is playing out is a rivalry within the Iranian-led camp.
The decision by Zaidan’s allies, Khazali and Zaidi, to integrate the armed elements of their organizations into the state security forces (or at least to declare their intention to do so) represents an effort by a pro-Iranian element to consolidate its power and mitigate the risk of US economic moves against their system.
It does not, the US special envoy’s X post notwithstanding, in any sense imply the victory of independent Iraqi sovereignty, or the decline of the IRGC’s grip on Baghdad. Rather, it is testimony to the depth and complexity of the Iranian system in Iraq, and the multifaceted nature of Tehran’s project.