The Kurdistan Region of Iraq has always been a major node for regional and international trade, heading both east and west. But, in recent years, the Sulaymaniyah governorate in eastern Iraqi Kurdistan has become a hub for Iranian narco trafficking. The trafficking of heroin from Afghanistan heading to Europe through Turkey is not a new problem, but in recent years, the trafficking of synthetic drugs, such as Crystal Methamphetamine and Captagon, has dramatically increased.
The flow of narcotics between Iran and the Sulaymaniyah governorate of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has evolved from a secondary transit concern into a critical regional security crisis. Sulaymaniyah serves as a primary gateway for the "Balkan Route" and the flourishing synthetic drug trade, driven by economic desperation, geopolitical maneuvering, and the porous nature of the Zagros Mountains.
Iranian narcos
Synthetic drug production and trafficking in Iran involves a complex overlap of small-scale local "cooks," cross-border smuggling networks, and alleged high-level involvement from state-embedded actors. While the Iranian government officially maintains a strict anti-drug stance, frequently carrying out mass seizures and executions, international observers and intelligence reports highlight a different reality behind the scenes.
The most significant entity linked to large-scale synthetic drug activity is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). While the IRGC officially combats trafficking, they have been repeatedly accused by the US Treasury, the UN, and independent investigators of facilitating the transit of narcotics by "taxing" shipments in exchange for safe passage. The IRGC controls Iran’s borders and ports.
In 2012, the US Treasury designated IRGC-Qods Force’s General Gholamreza Baghbani as a narcotics trafficker, alleging he allowed Afghan traffickers to move drugs through Iran in exchange for moving weapons to the Taliban.
Profits from the drug trade are reportedly used to fund regional proxies like Hezbollah (which has its own extensive history with Captagon and synthetic drugs) and militias in Iraq and Syria.
Historically, Iran was a major producer of "Shisheh" (crystalline methamphetamine). However, following a domestic crackdown and tighter regulations on precursor chemicals (like pseudoephedrine), production has largely shifted. Much of the methamphetamine now found in Iran, and trafficked out of Iran, is produced in Afghanistan using the Ephedra plant.
While the raw "liquid meth" or plant-based ephedrine often comes from Afghanistan, it is frequently refined into high-purity crystal form in laboratories within Iran’s border provinces, such as Sistan-Baluchistan and Khorasan. In urban areas like Tehran, synthetic drugs are also produced by decentralized, small-scale criminal networks. These criminal groups often focus on the domestic market, where methamphetamine has become the second most popular drug after opium. Many of these local operations survive by bribing low- and mid-level law enforcement, allowing them to operate in plain sight within impoverished neighborhoods.
Recent reports from 2024 and 2025 (such as those from the Institute for Science and International Security) have raised concerns that IRGC-affiliated universities and research centers are exploring the large-scale synthesis of pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) like fentanyl and medetomidine. The concern is that these are being developed not just for the illicit market, but as potential "incapacitating" chemical weapons for military use.
Sulaymaniyah governorate
The 500-kilometer border between Iran and the Kurdistan Region, specifically the stretches near Sulaymaniyah, is defined by rugged, mountainous terrain that is notoriously difficult to police. For centries this border has been the lifeblood of local economies through the kolbar system: Kurdish porters who carry goods on their backs across mountain passes.
While the majority of kolbar activity involves legitimate consumer goods (electronics, cigarettes, food) to circumvent sanctions and high taxes, the infrastructure they provide has been co-opted by the Iranian narco traffickers. Small-scale smuggling routes are now integrated into larger, hierarchical networks that transport high-value narcotics.
To understand the narcotics landscape between Iran and Sulaymaniyah, we must look at the specific geography of the "Green Corridor" and the chemical shift toward synthetic drug production.
The border between the Iranian province of Kurdistan (Sanandaj) and the Iraqi governorate of Sulaymaniyah is a sieve of informal crossings. Trafficking logic follows the path of least resistance, favoring mountain passes over official border gates.
- The Penjwen-Bashmakh Hub: The Bashmakh border crossing is the official gateway, but the surrounding district of Penjwen is the actual staging ground. Smugglers use the dense forests and steep valleys to move goods. By 2025, Penjwen recorded a 300% increase in narco trafficking cases.
- The Southern Flank (Halabja/Hawraman): To the south of Sulaymaniyah, the Hawraman mountain range provides high-altitude cover. This route is favored for smaller, high-value shipments of Crystal Meth (Shabo) because the terrain is inaccessible to heavy vehicles, requiring only human couriers (kolbars) or drones.
- The Northern Divert (Raperin): In the north of the governorate, near the Qandil Mountains, routes often intersect with areas controlled by various non-state armed groups. These "political" routes are often used for bulkier shipments of Captagon moving from Iraq and Syria back into Iran for regional distribution.
Iran remains the primary transit point for Afghan opiates. Heroin and opium enter Iran via its eastern border and are moved across the country to Sulaymaniyah. From here, they are trafficked toward Turkey and onward to European markets. Sulaymaniyah’s proximity to major Iranian cities such as Sanandaj and Kermanshah makes it a traditional hub for these shipments.
But the most alarming trend in recent years is the explosion of crystal methamphetamine. Crystal meth has flooded Sulaymaniyah as it is trafficked into Europe and the Gulf states. UNODC reports from late 2024 and 2025 indicate that Iraq is transitioning from a transit zone to a consumer market. There is increasing evidence of "conversion labs" near the border, where chemical precursors, often smuggled in from Europe, are used to refine meth on-site to reduce the risk of long-distance transport.
The most significant development in 2024–2025 is the transition from importing finished drugs to domestic refining within the border areas. Traffickers have realized that moving liquid precursors is less risky than moving finished crystal meth. Traffickers are increasingly setting up "kitchen labs" in the rural outskirts of Sulaymaniyah and the surrounding villages.
Unlike Western meth, which relies on diverted pharmaceuticals, the meth coming through Iran often uses the Ephedra plant, which grows wild in the region. This makes the supply chain nearly impossible to cut off at the chemical source. Precursors like P2P often enter the KRI via legitimate industrial channels (cleaning supplies, plastic manufacturing) before being diverted to illegal labs near the Iranian border.
While Syria remains the primary producer of Captagon, Iranian-linked networks have begun utilizing the Sulaymaniyah route to move these amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) toward the Gulf States.
The traffickers’ tactics combine traditional and modern methods bypass traditional border security.
- Aerial Smuggling: In 2025, Iranian and Iraqi officials reported an increase in the use of drones and paragliders to transport high-value packages of meth and heroin over the mountains, avoiding land-based checkpoints.
- Militia Involvement: Reports suggest that various armed groups and "shadow" networks, some with alleged ties to regional political factions and the IRGC, facilitate the movement of drugs. These groups provide "protection" for shipments in exchange for a share of the profits, which helps fund their operations amid tightening international sanctions.
- Corruption: The high profit margins of narcotics allow traffickers to bribe underpaid border officials on both sides, ensuring that "green lanes" are kept open during specific windows of time.
The local social impact
The influx of drugs has had a devastating impact on the social fabric of Sulaymaniyah and its border towns like Penjwen. Once considered a "clean" transit point, Sulaymaniyah now faces a public health crisis. Local authorities in 2024 reported a fourfold increase in drug-related arrests compared to previous years. In border districts, the drug trade provides a lucrative, albeit dangerous, alternative to the stagnant formal economy. This creates a "narco-economy" where local youth are recruited as couriers, further destabilizing the region.
The response to this crisis has been divided for various reasons. On the one hand, there is high-level diplomatic cooperation; on the other, deep-seated institutional friction.
In late 2025, the Iraqi Interior Ministry and Iranian anti-narcotics directorates began conducting more frequent joint raids. One notable operation in December 2025 resulted in the seizure of 64 kg of high-purity narcotics in the Iranian city of Abadan, which is near the border with Iraq's southernmost Basra province.
Both Iran and the KRI maintain strict "war on drugs" policies, with Iran frequently employing the death penalty for traffickers. However, these punitive measures have failed to address the root causes: poverty and the high demand for narcotics in Europe and the Gulf states.
Effective policing is often hampered by the complex relationship between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil, the local PUK-led administration in Sulaymaniyah, and the central government in Baghdad. Disagreements over border control jurisdiction frequently create security vacuums that traffickers exploit.
As of 2026, the Kurdish security forces of the Asayish and the Peshmerga are struggling with three main tactical and technological gaps:
- Commercial Drone Detection: Small commercial drones are now used for "scouting" ahead of kolbars. If a drone sees a security force patrol, the couriers stash the drugs in pre-arranged mountain caches (marked by GPS) and retreat.
- Large Drone Detecting and Interception: Larger drones are being used to transport shipments over unpassable border terrain and also internally to circumvent security checkpoints.
- Penetration of Encrypted Finances: Payments for large shipments are rarely made in cash. The use of Hawala (traditional trust-based banking) has been augmented by Tether (USDT) and other stablecoins, making it difficult for regional authorities to freeze the assets of "Narco-Lords" operating from within Iranian or Iraqi cities.
The Iran-Sulaymaniyah narcotics corridor is a microcosm of the broader challenges facing the Middle East: the intersection of economic sanctions, the "meth-ification" of global drug markets, and the use of illicit trade to fund non-state actors. While security operations have become more frequent, the mountainous terrain and the immense profitability of the trade suggest that Sulaymaniyah will remain a central node in the regional drug ecosystem for the foreseeable future.