On May 16, 1915, the first skyscrapers appeared through the haze over New York Harbor.
On the deck of the approaching ship stood a young law student and Zionist activist, freshly deported from Ottoman Palestine, staring at the burgeoning country before him.
He wrote in his journal: “We, who want to build a new land in a wilderness out of ruins, need to learn how the deportees and persecuted people from England founded a huge, rich country with unparalleled treasures and creative power.”
The young man was David Ben-Gurion, and his attitude explains why love of America is a foundational instinct of the state he established.
It also explains why few things have so unsettled Israelis’ peace of mind as the growing number of polls showing a rapidly diminishing number of Americans who love them back.
The cause is “100%” attributable to social media, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told 60 Minutes. That is likely a factor, but it sits awkwardly with his earlier reassurance that Israel’s standing in America has cratered before and that a postwar rebound is inevitable.
Whether or not his theory holds, the shift has created a new genre – the end-of-the-special-relationship essay.
In its most morally infused form, it involves three characters: an awakening American public, an unresponsive government, and a monolithic Israel.
After a listing of Israel’s sins, the essays end with the same prophecy: the day is fast approaching when Washington will no longer be beguiled by malicious forces, will heed the will of its people, and will sever ties with the Jewish state.
Set aside the geopolitical realities and deep institutional bonds that make such a clean break improbable. The genre’s bigger mistake is the omission of a fourth character: the Israeli people.
To put it simply: Israelis love America.
In Pew’s 2025 global survey, no public on Earth was more likely than Israelis to name the United States as their country’s most important ally (95%). And 83% of Israelis held a favorable view of the country even as the rest of the world’s opinion sank.
More than that, they are obsessed with anything that even vaguely hints at the US. As the journalist and former Knesset member Ofer Shelah put it, America “is our strongest friend, our cowboy, without whom who knows where we would be. And at the same time, America is everything we are not.”
Residents of the land of milk and honey look enviously at what they see as the true land of plenty. The Israeli rock duo Fortis-Sakharof summarized the sentiment in their 1990 song “America”: “Is there a limit?/There is no limit.”
Perhaps the greatest symbol of the attachment is, ironically, the man now blamed for squandering it.
Netanyahu is the closest thing Israel has to an American coastal elite: raised outside Philadelphia; educated at MIT; and his first successful campaign, in 1996, ran true American style by the New York consultant Arthur Finkelstein.
Far from breeding distrust, his Americanness was an asset. His fluent English and foreign degrees read as qualifications to voters who widely mocked his opponent Shimon Peres for his heavy accent. Peres’s fluent French was deemed worthless by comparison.
Even now, 30 years later, a Netanyahu adviser ran an online campaign mocking Yashar leader Gadi Eisenkot’s English accent as not American enough.
What will Israelis do when America doesn’t love them back?
As with every emotionally charged international issue, the fate of the America-Israel relationship seems to be domestication.
In America, Israel has already become the subject of an ongoing culture war, featuring disproportionately in primaries from New York to Michigan to Colorado.
In Israel, something similar has begun. When Democrats swept Congress this month, the opposition, like some Republicans, laid the blame at Netanyahu’s feet.
Yair Golan said the result showed “just how toxic Netanyahu has become” and warned of “a confrontation with the United States.”
Yair Lapid reminded voters: “Israel doesn’t choose sides in America. We work with everyone.” Even Eisenkot pledged to “renew and deepen that partnership.”
“Who lost America?” has become an Israeli political question, precisely as “Who stands with Israel?” has become an American one. Naturally, because Israel needs America far more than the reverse, the question carries an unmistakable note of fear.
But the central question remains: Suppose the Left is wrong, and Netanyahu is not the tumor. Suppose Netanyahu is wrong too, and the wound will not heal on its own. What will Israelis do when America doesn’t love them back?
Here the end-of-the-special-relationship genre stumbles onto a correct observation: on this question, Israel is indeed monolithic.
Hopes expressed by Peter Beinart that tough measures will empower “pragmatic forces” to “push their own government toward a different path” will be disappointed.
The genre’s omission of the Israeli people is its great flaw because, as such essayists so often do, it ignores Israel’s democratic nature.
The average Israeli’s mind is planted firmly in this country, not scanning the horizon for shifts in foreign opinion. Netanyahu spoke for the country when, after Joe Biden’s administration paused a shipment of heavy bombs in 2024, he stated: “If we need to stand alone, we will stand alone.”
Even as it campaigns on repairing the US relationship, the opposition also runs on rebuking US policy, assuring a public wary of dependence that, unlike Netanyahu, it will not lay Israel’s security at US President Donald Trump’s feet.
In a recent JPPI survey, 77% of Jewish Israelis said Israel should coordinate with Washington whenever possible but ultimately act in its own best interests when the two conflict.
Love may be intoxicating, but Israelis will not drink poison for the sake of American affection. They will, however, swallow a draft they first eyed with suspicion if Washington vouches for it.
If the US’s objective is truly a change in Israeli policy, it has tremendous resources to bring to bear before it comes to sanctions. As noted, no public in the Middle East feels about America the way Israelis still do, and few in Europe come close.
Ben-Gurion withdrew from Sinai in 1957 on the strength of Dwight Eisenhower’s assurances; Ariel Sharon left Gaza in 2005 with George W. Bush’s letter in hand. Both promises were later diluted or abandoned.
Yet an American guarantee still carries real weight. As recently as last October, it was enough for the IDF to pull back inside Gaza before a single living hostage had come home.
A hostile approach squanders that trust in favor of twisting Israel’s arm, on the curious theory that pressure may have hardened other countries against the US but will make Israelis pliant.
It will not.
Over a century ago, Ben-Gurion looked out at America and saw a model for the country he hoped to build. Yet when he established the state 33 years later, he routinely resisted American dictates, famously declaring, “It doesn’t matter what the Gentiles say; it matters what the Jews do.”
His archival, Menachem Begin, did much the same. As he put it while prime minister, “The people of Israel have lived for 3,700 years without an agreement with America, and will continue to live for another 3,700 years without it.”
On that, there remains a bipartisan consensus.
The writer is an English editor for Amit Segal, focusing primarily on issues relating to Israel and the Jewish people.