This article was written while the US midterm elections are ongoing, and before US President Donald Trump decided which approach to take in continuing the campaign against Iran. By the time you read it, events may have unfolded very differently from what I anticipated when I wrote it. I am willing to take that risk.
Trump said he would not attack before the midterm elections. He still preferred to give diplomacy time to run its course, but on his terms, and that is what happened. On the other hand, if the Iranians do not accept his clear conditions, as appears likely despite mediation efforts by Qatar and Pakistan in Doha, Trump may decide, as he has said, to launch a “powerful, targeted, and short” strike.
The Iranians have already said that if this happens, Trump may start a campaign, but they will be the ones to decide when it ends and on what terms. They have no intention of surrendering or accepting Trump’s conditions, although that, too, may depend on the scale and intensity of the strike.
As we approach the next stage in this ongoing saga, it is important to look back briefly and understand what happened at the White House before the United States and Iran signed the hollow and problematic memorandum of understanding (MoU) at the end of June. The agreement collapsed completely within days, although it was not officially declared dead until about a month after it was signed.
Following the success of the Israeli-American campaign, which severely damaged large parts of Iran’s nuclear, ballistic-missile, and drone infrastructure, but did not eliminate them entirely, and given Iran’s weaker position than ever, the regime decided to use the only card it had left: the Strait of Hormuz, which I discussed at length in this newspaper in an article that went viral, titled “Between the Straits.”
As I understand it, Trump was deeply frustrated by Iran’s calculated and maximalist use of the straits as a weapon. So, he summoned the military commanders, Admiral Brad Cooper and General Dan Caine, senior Pentagon officials, Pete Hegseth and his aides, White House officials, his closest advisers Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, and Vice President JD Vance for consultations at the White House. He asked them to present an immediate solution to the problem.
The two options presented to him did not appeal to him at all: continuing the heavy economic pressure and imposing a blockade on the strait, which were expected to produce results within about a year; or launching a broad war, including the use of ground forces, which could produce results within four to six weeks, but will cost the life of brave American warriors.
That was probably what led the president, over the course of a single night, to shift from firm blunt threats to topple the regime, to effusive praise for the Iranians, and to send his advisers, together with the vice president, to secure an agreement. They returned with the problematic MoU.
Instead of mistakenly signing the MoU, the United States should have continued its maximum-pressure campaign in the Strait of Hormuz, strengthened the naval blockade with an air blockade, and carried out massive strikes against the regime’s interests, all while holding talks toward a future agreement on US terms, until Iran surrendered, or the people of Iran took to the streets again.
Maximum-pressure campaign against Iran opposed by Trump advisers
Trump did not receive support for this approach from his close advisers, especially Vance. In fact, they opposed it. Domestic pressures ahead of the midterm elections and the fuel-price crisis, pressure from close Gulf allies, the long timeline the military presented for the pressure campaign to take effect, and a clear reluctance to enter an all-out war that would cause many casualties, all pushed him toward an approach that quickly proved mistaken. After the MoU collapsed, the president was effectively steered back toward the right solution: continuing the maximum pressure campaign, which simply requires a great deal of patience.
Of course, I do not know which direction Trump will choose after the midterm elections, or whether the Iranians will take a desperate preemptive step that forces him to decide. For now, though, he does not seem to have made up his mind. Anyone who claims to know for certain what will happen in the coming days is simply groping in the dark.
If the president chooses the military option, my recommendations for how to conduct the nuclear negotiations later in this article will have no immediate relevance, although even then there may eventually be a future chance to return to the negotiating table. If the president makes another mistake and returns to the negotiating table with the Iranians now, where, in light of past lessons, he has no chance of winning, it is at least worth understanding what people mean when they say that the goal of negotiations is to ensure Iran does not use the negotiation period to advance its nuclear program.
Despite the Iranians’ arrogance and their consistent contempt for the United States and its representatives in negotiations, maintaining the status quo would require completely dismantling everything that remains in Iran’s nuclear program before negotiations even begin. That is not likely to happen, because I understand the United States is not even demanding it.
At the time, the president should have instructed the negotiating team to present one clear principal demand, one Iran would not accept until it had no other choice, which would happen if the pressure continued and intensified: the complete dismantlement of everything remaining in Iran’s nuclear, ballistic-missile, and drone programs, alongside an end to support for terrorism and the repression of the Iranian people, and, of course, the unconditional opening of the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran would have to carry all of this out in advance. These should not be demands merely for the final outcome of negotiations, which the Iranians would of course oppose. In negotiations, they always win.
On the nuclear issue, it would not be enough to suspend enrichment, even for decades, or to remove all enriched material from Iran, certainly not to dilute it inside Iran. Instead, all enrichment facilities and capabilities must be fully dismantled; all enriched material, at every level, must be destroyed; all current and future underground enrichment facilities must be demolished; and all weapons groups and supporting laboratories must be shut down.
What are the minimum nuclear requirements?
- No transfer, or movement of any nuclear material, in any form, composition, or enrichment level, from its current location.
- No new activity involving conversion, enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water, or construction of new sites, especially underground.
- Full verification of all of the above through the restoration of the IAEA’s full inspection and monitoring mandate, including a complete account of developments in the programs since inspectors were expelled.
- No scientific activity, including activity presented as “dual-use” or academic, that could contribute to turning fissile material into a weapon or nuclear device.
- An absolute ban on access to sites where activities violating United Nations Security Council resolutions took place: Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, and Pickaxe MoUntain.
- The prohibitions must also cover activities that are not directly nuclear but use nuclear technologies, such as isotope production and the import of dual-use materials.
Any other decision would allow the Iranians to do exactly what they are experts at: play diplomatic games and drag out the process while projecting a “sense of victory” unsupported by events on the ground, beyond Iran’s boasts, and resume nuclear activity under the cover of negotiations.
It is important to understand that Iran’s top priority remains lifting the crushing sanctions and injecting billions into its collapsing economy, while preserving its nuclear capabilities and rebuilding its ballistic capabilities. Any injection of funds, even a few billion dollars, combined with permission to reopen the strait and resume Iranian oil and gas exports, would allow the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which effectively controls Iran, to calm domestic protests. At the same time, it would be able to use the money until Trump leaves office to rebuild terror networks and proxy forces, restore its defense capabilities and missile program, including missiles with ranges that could threaten US cities, and, of course, continue preparing for a renewed push toward nuclear weapons after 2028.
Trump recently said that toppling the Iranian regime is not necessary to solve the nuclear problem, but history shows otherwise. Only removing from decision making power those who want to develop a nuclear bomb can prevent one in the long term, and that can be done only by the Iranian people.
It is possible that continued heavy economic pressure will persuade the Iranian people, who remain crushed by the collapsing economy, to resume mass protests, as they did several months after “Rising Lion”, despite the obvious danger to their lives. Only the people can change Iran’s government.
Regime change is, of course, not guaranteed, and there is no certainty about how long it would take. But the civilized world, led by the United States and Trump, has no privilege to give up.
Iran likely to enter broad war, abandon Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
If Trump chooses to continue the heavy economic pressure while upholding the principles set out above, I expect Iran to choose one of the following paths. I will even venture to assign a probability to each:
- Declare that they are willing to “drink the poisoned peel” and entering negotiations: I assign this a probability of about 10 percent. Given Iran’s negotiating skills, I see this option as the greatest danger of all.
- Enter a broad war, either by choice or in response to an attack; strike American and their allies interests in the Gulf and around the world, including energy and communications infrastructure; leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and announce a drive to develop nuclear weapons: I assign this scenario a 60 percent probability.
- Maintain the current situation under heavy economic pressure and wait for November 2028 and Trump’s departure: I assign this scenario a 30 percent probability, despite the assessments cited above, by many experts, that the intense pressure will cause Iran’s economy to collapse completely within about nine months.
Prophecy may be the province of fools, but given the flood of questions I receive from Israel and abroad, I have chosen to present a quantitative assessment of the different probabilities, despite the risk of being declared as dumb.
Israel is not currently in the decision making position, and that is for the best. But if the United States asks Israel to join and take part, or if the Iranians make the grave mistake of attacking Israel, Israel will, of course, join the campaign on whatever scale is required.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Prof. Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a professor at the Technion. He served as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s national security adviser and as acting head of the National Security Council.