For decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has portrayed itself as one of the fiercest opponents of Israel. The regime invests billions in allies, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and justifies this with rhetoric about the destruction of the Jewish state. Anyone who looks only at this official line quickly gets the impression that hostility toward Israel is deeply rooted in Iranian society.
The reality, however, is more complex. Iranians, both inside the country and in the diaspora, have been increasingly demonstrating that their views toward Israel differ fundamentally from those of the Islamic regime. Among the Iranian diaspora, this is often visible in the form of Israeli flags being waved and video messages expressing support for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
This raises an important question: Why is support for Israel growing among many Iranians, even as they suffer from the consequences of recent attacks and while the Islamic regime continues to portray Israel as an arch-enemy?
From ally to arch-rival
Hostility toward Israel is not historically embedded in Iran. In the 1960s and 1970s, under the Shah, Iran maintained close ties with Israel, both economically and politically. Even the intelligence services of both countries maintained close cooperation. Before the revolution, Iran was home to approximately 80,000 to 100,000 Jews, most of whom fled after 1979, primarily to Israel and the United States. Until then, it was the largest Jewish community in the Middle East outside Israel.
A clear turning point came after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. From that moment on, anti-Israel ideology was systematically promoted. Compared to other parts of the region, hostility toward Israel is not a deeply rooted societal sentiment in Iran, but rather the result of decades of state propaganda and geopolitical choices made by the regime. For example, Iranian athletes have repeatedly been forced to withdraw from international competitions against Israeli opponents, despite their willingness to compete.
Ideology and indoctrination
Indoctrination begins in the education system. In school textbooks, the Holocaust is often downplayed or even denied. Israel and Jews are portrayed as the primary enemies of Islam. Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic regime, linked the struggle against Israel to the concept of “shahid” (martyr). According to this view, someone who dies in this struggle is considered a martyr, rewarded in paradise. This framing emphasizes sacrifice and religious meaning in conflict.
A frequently repeated narrative by high-ranking ayatollahs, including Ali Khamenei, is that Israel must be wiped off the map. According to various sources, including the Council on Foreign Relations, the Iranian regime sends approximately $100 million annually to organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah. This has had the opposite effect among the population. In a scenario where the regime disappears and financial support to armed groups ceases, the basis for hostility between Iran and Israel could fundamentally change.
Former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has also repeatedly claimed that the Holocaust is a “myth” used by the West to justify the existence of Israel, including in 2005 at a conference in Tehran.
Although this ideological line has been promoted for decades through education and media, recent developments and protests suggest that its effectiveness, particularly among younger generations, is declining.
A growing divide within society
This is reflected in public opinion: Slogans such as “No Gaza, no Lebanon, I sacrifice my life only for Iran” are supported by 64% of Iranians, while 73% agree with the statement that “the enemy is here, not abroad” (GAMAAN, 2021). These figures highlight growing opposition to the regime’s foreign agenda, which many believe comes at the expense of the Iranian people.
It is likely that these percentages have increased since the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement and recent protests (January 2026), although precise data is currently lacking. Increased digitalization and access to external information have also reduced the effectiveness of indoctrination compared to the early years of the revolution.
The perception that Iranians are hostile toward Israel is largely shaped by broader regional sentiment. In many Arab countries, strong anti-Israel attitudes prevail. Surveys by Arab Barometer show that in some countries, more than 80% of the population holds a negative view of Israel. This perception is often incorrectly projected onto Iranians.
To understand Iran’s demographic context, it is important to look at its younger generation, which seeks freedom and better diplomatic and international relations with Israel and the United States. According to GAMAAN (2023), 80% of the population opposes the regime, while approximately 75% support the principle of Responsibility to Protect, indicating broad support for external intervention to protect civilians (GAMAAN, 2022).
As Israel and the United States take action, some Iranians perceive this as military support. The argument that foreign intervention should be condemned is less widely accepted, partly because the regime itself has relied on foreign militias, such as Hezbollah and other regional allies, to suppress protests.
Notably, calls by Iranian state media and social channels for mass protests against foreign intervention received little support, and large demonstrations did not materialize.
At the same time, uncertainty is growing among many Iranians about what comes next. Following the recent ceasefire, various sources, including Iran International, report that fears of internal repression and increased security controls are perceived by some as more alarming than the earlier bombardments.
Iranians are not supporters of war, but they are strongly opposed to the regime. They understand that this system is unlikely to change without external pressure. As the regime’s constructed enemies now intervene, sympathy for these countries is growing among parts of the population.
The near future will show what this means for the relationship between Iranians and Israel, and whether a hostility that was long presented as self-evident is no longer a central sentiment for many Iranians.
The writer is a public sector adviser in the Netherlands. Originally from Iran, he fled the country in 1998, and later lived and worked there again between 2016 and 2018. His writing focuses on Iranian society, generational change, and the evolving relationship between religion and state in Iran.