We are living in an era so strange and so detached from the norms that long have governed geopolitics, that something extraordinary has passed almost without remark.
For decades, there was an unspoken rule in international politics: leaders of countries did not kill one another. That’s collapsing – and while the logic seems in Iran’s case compelling, the consequences could be brutal.
The sudden emergence of a “decapitation” strategy – clearly embraced by Israel and, by extension, the United States in their joint war – marks a profound departure from how even bitter adversaries have conducted themselves in the modern era.
And it happened reportedly in the first minute of the war, with the assassination-by-bombardment of supreme leader Ali Khamenei – and then in last week’s killing of security chief Ali Larijani, believed to have been effectively in charge at the time.
This is significant enough in its potential implications to demand scrutiny as a doctrine – one without precedent in the modern era. States have mounted invasions, overthrown governments, and killed military figures, but have almost never acknowledged or normalized the direct targeting of a head of state. Israel itself has killed terrorist leaders before – and increasingly after the October 7 Hamas massacre, which started the current string of wars – but not heads of state.
Even at the height of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union avoided such actions. Both engaged in covert operations, backed coups, and attempted to influence or remove foreign leaders through proxies. The 1973 overthrow of Chilean president Salvador Allende, supported by the United States, is a case in point; Allende was killed in the coup, but not by Americans.
The normalization of targeting political leaders
Saddam Hussein was targeted during the 2003 invasion of Iraq and executed after a trial, but it was held by a nominally Iraqi special tribunal. And Muammar Gaddafi was killed during Libya’s civil war with NATO involvement – but by a local mob. Earlier historical periods offer looser precedents, when rulers were sometimes killed in war or intrigue, but under a different international system.
Even the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 – a killing that helped ignite World War I – was not the targeting of a sitting head of state by another government. He was the heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, killed by a Serbian nationalist conspirator, not a state actor.
In the modern era, sovereign leaders, however objectionable or hostile, were not treated as routine military targets. There was a preservation instinct at play as well: Once heads of state become legitimate targets, all heads of state become legitimate targets. There might be, rather inconveniently, no end to it.
Indeed, there are now growing fears that American or Israeli leaders could become targets. Iran has threatened US President Donald Trump, and there are reports about drone threats against his senior officials. Moreover, the anti-American, anti-Zionist wing of social media is rife with false (and celebratory) claims, which some really believe, that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been targeted and killed.
It seems safe to say that the threat level to any leader or any country now traveling around the world has measurably increased, and eventually an attacker might succeed. They – and their supporters – will be as convinced of the justice of their cause as those who support killing the vile Khamenei.
So was this a smart move?
The legitimacy argument is seductive but dangerous. Many would argue that a whole host of dictators around the world, fomenting war and staying in power through repression and mass murder, “deserve” removal from the scene. But especially in a world as polarized as ours, there will be many others who are cynical about the West and would rejoice at the killing of its elected leaders.
Sometimes it can be argued that the ends justify the means. Leadership matters, and systems that appear stable can be brittle beneath the surface. Remove key figures, and perhaps they might collapse amid a general rejoicing.
There are times – rare, but they exist – when a consensus can form around the desirability and legitimacy of interference of this kind. The case in point is Adolf Hitler, and it is instructive: the Nazi regime was monstrous enough – to its own people as well as the world – to justify intervention, and its entire organizing principle depended, incredibly enough, on one highly bizarre man.
In Iran’s case, it may be possible to argue that the first condition is met – not only because of its epic domestic repression, but also and especially because of the insistence on exporting jihadist revolution to its neighbors via proxy militias. But the second condition, alas, may not – there is little reason to believe that Khamenei personally was critical for the Islamic Republic apparatus to survive.
That may not be a fatal flaw. The message, clearly, is also directed at other players – perhaps chiefly at the military, in hopes that it would finally stage a coup. But there is also the possibility that in such situations, anyone willing to step into such dangerous shoes would be as fanatical as the departed, or worse.
The Iranian regime may yet collapse – which would be cause for celebration – but it may also double down. The remaining leadership seems to be betting that it can so rattle oil markets that Trump will eventually call it a day.
Everyone will claim victory – in the Iranian regime’s sad case, merely for having survived.
So what should be the strategy now? What are the lessons so far?
If the objective is to either force surrender terms on Iran (an end to the nuclear, ballistic missile, and militia programs) or to bring down the regime, decapitation alone will probably not suffice. A system like Iran’s will fall only when it can no longer function – when it cannot repress, pay its people, or spread paralyzing fear. That requires a broader effort that offers a credible vision of what follows; if the alternative appears to be chaos, even opponents of the regime may cling to it.
The United States should have been preparing the foundation long before launching the war – ensuring that when the system is in a deep enough shock due to the “decapitation,” men with guns would swiftly take over, backed by massive support on the streets.
Such protests would need the people to understand that the regime’s repression mechanism is in chaos. And it would require a swiftly organized and visible new set of civilian figures alongside the military ones, presenting as a transition structure en route to democracy.
It is actually possible in Iran, because much of its society is quite modern and even Western-oriented. A version of this may still work – even if not now, then not too far into the future.
And if it does, it will be critical to message that everything about this war was an exception, if not a total singularity. There’s no advantage in normalizing the killing of leaders. If that becomes a tool of statecraft, every leader is a target. It will blow up a fragile equilibrium that has kept the world even partly sane and stable.
The writer is the former Cairo-based Middle East editor and London-based Europe/Africa editor of the Associated Press, the former chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem, and the author of two books.