With the United States and Israel now striking Iran directly, a new phase of confrontation has begun. Military action may degrade capabilities and buy time, but it is unlikely, on its own, to produce regime change in Tehran.
Air power can destroy facilities, degrade defenses, eliminate commanders, and delay programs, but it rarely produces political capitulation. Japan in 1945 was the exception, not the rule. The Islamic Republic is built to absorb punishment and tighten repression. The 12 Day War in June 2025 damaged assets and rattled the system, but it did not dismantle the political machine that generates the threat.
Israel must also assume that this operation – however forceful – will end on an American timetable. A US president can declare victory and pivot home. Israel cannot. Even if the immediate danger is reduced, Tehran can rebuild missile capabilities faster than outsiders hope. That creates a Sisyphean cycle of “mowing the grass,” each round carrying higher risks to Israel’s economy and civilian resilience, especially if a less sympathetic US administration takes office in a few years.
The US would prefer a less hostile regime in Iran, but America’s existence isn’t threatened by the Islamic Republic. Israel’s is. That asymmetry is why Jerusalem cannot treat regime change as a rhetorical aspiration to outsource to Washington; it must become a strategic objective grounded in what force can – and cannot – achieve. Only political change in Tehran can permanently reduce the threat.
The timing for regime change
The timing is unusually favorable. The regime looks more vulnerable than at any point since 1979: War exposed weaknesses, protests reveal collapsing credibility, and repression has been so brutal that credible reporting cites death tolls in the tens of thousands. A state that must govern by blackout and massacre is a state in deep legitimacy crisis.
Here is the uncomfortable truth: Despite its existential stake, Israel has no coherent political strategy for increasing the likelihood of regime change. It has world-class military capabilities against Iranian threats, but no equally sophisticated political effort to change the regime that generates them.
None of this will be easy. But statecraft is about shifting probabilities, not waiting for certainty. If Israel could raise the odds of regime change from one-in-ten to one-in-three over time, it would be foolish not to try – especially if much of the effort remains quiet and indirect.
Only Iranians can topple Iran’s rulers. Overt Israeli sponsorship would backfire, allowing the regime to brand protesters as foreign agents. No public endorsements. No photo-ops. The work must be largely invisible.
Regime change strategy
So what should such a strategy focus on? Think of it as an equation with three variables: the opposition’s organizational capacity; the regime’s cohesion; and the information space that shapes public sentiment and elite calculations.
First, opposition capacity. Iran’s street energy is real but fragmented. In such moments, leadership and organization matter. Reza Pahlavi has emerged – fairly or not – as a focal point for many Iranians seeking national unity. Protesters chant his name. Persian-language media debate his role. He does not command a movement, but he may be uniquely positioned to bridge monarchists, republicans, secular activists, reform-minded clerics, and disaffected elites.
Israel’s role is not to crown a successor. It is to help create conditions for a credible Iranian-led vehicle to form – one with funding, organization, and a serious transition framework.
That vehicle must energize business leaders squeezed by IRGC monopolies, clerics concerned about moral decay, technocrats frustrated by isolation, and security officials wary of tying their fate to a weakening regime. Above all, it must offer insiders a safe exit and an orderly path forward. Without structure, protests fade. With it, defections become possible.
Israel must also recognize a harder reality: Any serious transition strategy must consider how opposition forces can outlast violent repression and fight back. Indirectly establishing small sleeper cells and preparing weapons depots within the country for use at the right time against security forces may be necessary to ensure any attempted transition succeeds. Political change will require more than courage. It will require preparation.
Second, regime cohesion. Regimes fall when insiders defect, stand aside, or refuse to repress. Israel’s intelligence capabilities give it unusual insight into fissures within Iran’s security services, clerical establishment, and economic elite. Used wisely – and coordinated with Washington and trusted partners – that insight can help ensure pressure widens cracks rather than inadvertently unifying the system, shaping conditions in which elite defection becomes more likely.
Third, the information arena. Tehran’s first instinct in crisis is isolation: throttling the Internet, jamming platforms, flooding the zone with propaganda, and hunting organizers. Helping Iranians preserve access to independent media and secure communications strengthens civil society and influences elite calculations – especially among those who ultimately decide whether to repress. Amplifying grievances – and signaling that there is a safe path to stand aside or defect – among mid-level security forces could prove decisive during the next wave of unrest.
Beyond these pillars, Israel should work with Washington to sustain economic and diplomatic pressure that constrains the regime’s coercive budget long after any air campaign ends.
Moments of regime weakness rarely last. Tehran will adapt and rebuild as long as this regime survives. Airstrikes alone will not manufacture an Iranian revolution. But Israel can stop treating regime change as a slogan and start treating it as strategy – quiet, coordinated, and realistic. Iran’s future belongs to Iranians. But Israel – more than America – has the enduring interest in ensuring that future gets a chance.
The writer is a leading expert on fragile states and political transitions. He is a lecturer at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.