After the strikes: Planning for Iran’s 'day after' - opinion

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—whether one agrees with all of his policies or not—must be acknowledged for having reshaped the strategic landscape of the Middle East in profound ways. He has also profoundly influenced Israel’s history. History will judge every leader in full complexity, but in honesty, Netanyahu’s role in redefining Israel’s regional posture and strategic doctrine ensures that his tenure will be remembered as a consequential chapter in the story of the State of Israel.

The Abraham Accords, which he helped bring to fruition, were not merely diplomatic agreements. They marked a structural shift in regional thinking: from permanent confrontation to strategic integration. At a time when many believed the region was trapped in outdated paradigms, Israel chose normalization, technological partnership, and economic cooperation as instruments of stability.

At the same time, Netanyahu made clear that normalization could not come at the expense of security. Israel confronted Iran’s proxy network—Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis—while also addressing the regime that finances, arms, and directs them. The US administration's commitment to deterrence, the professionalism of the IDF, and the extraordinary capabilities of the Mossad supported these efforts.

Yet it would be a mistake to interpret the Islamic Republic as a personality-driven regime. Iran is not a system that collapses with the removal of a single leader. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is not merely a military arm; it is an ideological institution, an intelligence apparatus, and a vast economic conglomerate deeply embedded within the state.

Hostility toward Israel and the United States is not tactical within this structure—it is doctrinal. The threat persists as long as the ideology continues to guide coercive institutions. Military degradation, which refers to the weakening of a country's military capabilities, may restore deterrence temporarily. Institutional transformation is what determines long-term stability.

If recent developments have shown anything, it is that strategy cannot end with successful operations. It must extend to what follows.

Iran is facing mounting structural pressure: economic fragility, sanctions, constrained proxy networks, and recurring domestic unrest. The regime’s margin for maneuver is narrowing. Such an environment does not guarantee systemic change. But it creates the possibility of this.

If systemic change were to occur—whether through gradual erosion, elite fracture, or popular uprising—the most dangerous moment would be the immediate aftermath.

Four immediate priorities would need to be addressed on Day One: securing Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure to prevent proliferation or sabotage; preventing fragmentation within the armed forces and ensuring that elements of the IRGC do not reorganize into rogue militias; preserving the country’s territorial integrity and avoiding separatist conflict; and supporting the rapid formation of a transitional authority capable of restoring order while preparing the ground for constitutional governance.

Serious strategic planning requires engagement now with credible opposition figures and civil-society networks.

Among the most visible opposition figures internationally is Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. His father’s legacy remains debated, and history must be examined honestly. But he bears no responsibility for that past. It is also historically accurate that Iran experienced periods of modernization and institutional development prior to the rigidity that ultimately undermined the monarchy.

Today’s Iran is not 1979. Iranian youth are more educated, more globally connected, and more exposed to democratic norms than any previous generation. They are not seeking another autocracy. They seek dignity, economic opportunity, and accountable governance.

Reza Pahlavi has consistently advocated secular statehood, national reconciliation, and a democratic referendum allowing Iranians to determine their political system. Whether he takes the lead or not, the Iranian people must ultimately decide Iran's future.

Prime Minister Netanyahu himself has emphasized that Israel’s conflict is not with the Iranian people, but with the regime that represses them and threatens its neighbors. That distinction is strategically essential.

The Abraham Accords were not symbolic gestures; they represent a strategic model: integration, technological cooperation, and economic interdependence replacing ideological hostility.

This model is relevant not only for Arab states but also potentially for a future Iran. A young generation that seeks prosperity and global integration does not benefit from revolutionary dogma. It benefits from connectivity.

The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain assumed real political risk when they chose this path. They made a sovereign decision to align with modernization, openness, and regional cooperation. In return, they have faced retaliation from Iranian-backed actors, including missile and drone attacks targeting civilian areas.

When states choose peace and integration and are punished for it, credibility is tested. The US must clearly and without a doubt support the UAE and Bahrain. Security guarantees cannot be rhetorical; they must be operational, visible, and reliable.

Integrated air and missile defense systems, maritime coordination, intelligence sharing, and rapid-response mechanisms must form a durable regional defense architecture. Allies who choose modernization must not feel strategically exposed for doing so.

For Israel, this alignment is not merely diplomatic; it is structural. Whether we protect integration as firmly as we enforce deterrence will determine the future of regional stability.

Israel faces a strategic choice.

Jerusalem can limit itself to containment—degrading capabilities repeatedly as threats emerge. Or it can think beyond containment and quietly prepare for a post–Islamic Republic scenario in which a different Iran becomes possible.

That preparation requires prudence, intelligence coordination, strong regional partnerships, and strategic clarity. It requires understanding that ideological regimes can endure for decades—but they can also erode when internal pressures converge with external constraints.

Israel’s long-term security will not be secured solely by managing perpetual hostility. It will be secured when the ideological engine driving that hostility is replaced by a state that sees its future not in confrontation, but in regional integration and responsible statehood.

Preparing for that possibility is not naïve optimism. It is strategic foresight.

And in the Middle East, foresight is often the difference between temporary victories and lasting security.