While all eyes are focused on the Gulf to see whether there will be a war against Iran or an agreement with it, countries across the region are in search of their role and place.
The binary division prevailing before and during the war, between the “resistance axis” (which included Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis), the “moderate axis” (Israel, the peace and normalization states, alongside Saudi Arabia), and the “pro-Muslim Brotherhood axis” (Turkey and Qatar), is giving way to more flexible alignments that cut across old lines. These alignments do not view Iran – at least publicly – as their primary danger to the region.
On February 3, 2026, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia. A lengthy joint statement issued at the end of the visit reflected a shared desire to strengthen economic, energy, and security ties between the two countries. The statement also expressed broad agreement on most regional issues – Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Gaza, and Somalia – with particular emphasis on resolving the Palestinian conflict.
In general terms, both countries support preserving the territorial integrity of states threatened by irredentist forces. At the same time, the idea of Turkey joining the alliance signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan was dropped, apparently due to Ankara’s reluctance to alienate other Middle Eastern states.
At the same time, tensions have emerged between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – two close states that were integral to the peace and normalization axis – against the backdrop of competition and rivalry over developments in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia. In all three arenas, the UAE supports insurgent actors seeking to change the status quo. This represents a challenge not only to Saudi policy but also to Riyadh’s central position in the Arabian Peninsula, the Arab world, and the Middle East.
One day after his visit to Saudi Arabia, Erdogan arrived in Egypt for an official visit. There, too, agreements were reached to strengthen cooperation in economics, energy, and security, including an ambition to raise bilateral trade from $9 billion to $15b. annually, Egyptian gas supplies to Turkey, and expanded cooperation between the two navies.
The Egyptian-Turkish joint statement likewise expressed convergence on most regional issues. Erdoğan’s visit followed an August 2025 agreement on joint drone production, a joint naval exercise in September 2025, and a visit by the commander of the Turkish Air Force to Egypt on February 17, 2026.
A few days later, on February 23, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi arrived in Saudi Arabia – a visit intended to underscore cooperation between the two countries and their shared positions on almost all regional issues, especially the Palestinian question. Thus, trilateral coordination with Turkey was completed, albeit bilaterally.
Alongside this, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia participate in the “Group of Eight” – a somewhat unusual forum that also includes three Arab states (Jordan, the UAE, and Qatar) and two Muslim states (Pakistan and Indonesia). This represents a new phenomenon in regional political architecture, linking countries that are not geographically contiguous. Its origins lie in the Arab-Islamic summit convened in Riyadh in November 2023. That summit established a joint delegation to promote a ceasefire and humanitarian assistance in Gaza.
Since then, the group has met several times and issued joint statements. The most recent, on February 17, condemned unilateral decisions by the Israeli government regarding land expropriation in the “occupied territories,” warned of escalation on the ground, and called on the international community to take concrete steps to halt these measures.
This diplomatic pendulum is the product of the war on the one hand, and Israeli policy on the other. In practice, four main developments have driven these changes:
Weakening of the Iranian axis
The fact that Iran and its proxies in the Middle East were weakened following the Hamas-Israel war reduced levels of concern, especially among Gulf states. As a result, their need for Israel’s military capabilities declined. Given also the improvement in their relations with US President Donald Trump, the importance of Israel has diminished. It now appears that most regional states actually do not want a war against Iran, in order to avoid further destabilizing the region.
Israel’s aggressive regional policy
The old image of Israel as an aggressive state seeking regional hegemony through military force has resurfaced. Israel’s strike in Qatar prompted renewed doubts about the necessity and wisdom of public cooperation with the Jewish state. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is likewise perceived in the Middle East as an aggressive move aimed at asserting control and shaking regional stability, which rests on recognition of existing territorial states (Somalia, in this case).
Israel’s policy on the Palestinian issue
Israel’s conduct in Gaza; inflammatory statements by government ministers; settler harassment of Palestinians in the West Bank; violations of the status quo at the Temple Mount (al-Haram al-Sharif) that go unanswered; and Israel’s moves to take over land in Area C – all these place Israel at odds with nearly every regional actor, most of whom support, in one way or another, a political solution in Gaza and a two-state solution.
Public identification with Israel – let alone normalization agreements – is seen as illegitimate and potentially regime-threatening. Israel is also perceived as exploiting the region’s focus on Iran to implement facts on the ground.
An American ally that makes Israel redundant
For many years, Arab and Muslim states sought Israel’s assistance in leveraging its influence, and that of the Jewish lobby, with the US administration and Congress. Since Trump entered office in January 2025, however, he has cultivated friendly personal ties with most autocratic rulers in the Middle East, rendering Israeli mediation largely unnecessary. Even Israel’s recognition of Somaliland did not bring about US recognition, as Somaliland’s leadership may have hoped.
The regional storm unleashed by Hamas’s attack and the consequent war has produced confusion, instability, uncertainty, and insecurity – conditions that largely persist given the prospect of war with Iran on the horizon. In this environment of “shifting sands,” states tend to hedge risks: they avoid placing all their bets on a single actor, axis, or coalition. To a large extent, they have all become “Qatar” – that is, they pursue flexible policies, cultivating ties with as many countries as possible in order to preserve regime stability and regional balance.
As time passes, Israel’s military achievements in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria are eroding. At the same time, the diplomatic gains following the Abraham Accords – including prospects for normalization with Arab and Muslim states, especially Saudi Arabia – are fading.
Israel’s domestic politics continue to undermine its foreign policy, and unless a real change occurs, Israel may find itself isolated. For many, “a people that dwells alone” is seen as the Jewish people’s fate – but developments in the region since the agreements with Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians, and the Abraham Accords states show that it does not have to be so.
The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is a board member of Mitvim, and a member of the Coalition for Regional Security.