Israel is a country blessed – or cursed (depends on your perspective) – by a relentless pace of events. News breaks with such speed and intensity that it rarely leaves time to pause, reflect, or fully absorb what has happened and what it means.
Everything feels existential, strategic, and unprecedented. And paradoxically, when something truly important occurs, it risks being lost in the noise.
This week was a case in point. Everything paled in comparison to the news of the return of the body of Ran Gvili, the heroic police officer who fought to defend southern Israel on October 7 and whose body was abducted to Gaza by Hamas.
In a remarkable intelligence, medical, and military operation, his remains were identified and brought home for burial. It marked the closing of a chapter that has remained an open wound ever since October 7 – not only for his family, but for the country and for Jews around the world.
For the first time, Israelis were able not merely to remove the yellow hostage pins or stop the clock in Hostage Square, but to begin doing what they could not do until now: heal.
All of this unfolded against the backdrop of mounting tension with Iran as what President Donald Trump has called the “armada” deploys to the region F-15 squadrons, naval vessels armed with Tomahawk missiles, and the daily question hovering over the country: will he strike or won’t he, and if he does, how will Tehran respond?
Amid this uncertainty and relentless pace, another major story broke this week, one that largely slid under the radar and, despite occurring only days ago, has already been forgotten.
Lessons from the submarine affair
On Sunday, the state commission established four years ago to investigate the so-called submarine affair published its findings.
The conclusions were damning – for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for former Mossad chief Yossi Cohen, and for the broader way in which national-security decisions are made in Israel.
The commission, led by former Supreme Court president Asher Grunis, determined that the submarine procurement process, including Germany’s sale of submarines to Egypt, “endangered the security of the state.”
More troubling than any individual decision, however, was what the report revealed about how the government actually functions: a security cabinet kept in the dark; information poorly processed or not shared at all; critical conversations left undocumented; minimal transparency; ministers asked to vote on matters of grave consequence without truly understanding what they are voting on.
“The committee found that despite its responsibility, the security cabinet does not really decide on force buildup in Israel,” Grunis and the other panel members wrote. “Ministers told the committee that they felt like a rubber stamp for decisions made by the defense establishment.”
At first glance, the submarine affair may seem unrelated to October 7 or to the war Israel has been fighting for more than two years. But it is directly connected.
We all remember the months leading up to October 7 – the judicial overhaul, the protests tearing the country apart, the warnings sent, the intelligence briefings requested, and the chief of staff seeking meetings on the eve of critical votes.
There were signs and letters written by intelligence officers. Concerns were raised, but no one had the full picture.
The submarine affair pales in comparison to the failures that led to October 7. But the decision-making culture that enabled both is the same. And, disturbingly, it appears to still be in place.
Ministers privately describe cabinet meetings consumed by micro-tactical issues. This week, for example, ministers were briefed in detail on how the Rafah Crossing would open – who would be allowed through and how.
Is this really the role of the security cabinet? Even ministers acknowledge that their job is to set policy, while professionals – in consultation with the defense minister or prime minister – should handle on-the-ground implementation.
This focus on minutiae is not accidental; it is by design.
It keeps ministers occupied with details instead of forcing them to determine strategy and policy. It is how the cabinet has functioned for years, and certainly since Netanyahu returned to office in 2009.
The submarine affair should alarm every Israeli because it shows that the writing was on the wall long before October 7 and that the system is not working. Coordination between intelligence agencies is flawed, information reaching the cabinet is incomplete, and decision-making is centralized and opaque.
All of this could be fixed – if there were a decision to fix it. If this were only about submarines, perhaps Israelis could live with it. October 7 proved that we cannot. The lessons must be learned and reforms implemented. Otherwise, the lives lost in this war will have truly been in vain.
There is also a broader question. If the public shrugs off the submarine commission and there is no demand for accountability, why should anyone expect a future commission of inquiry into October 7 to lead to real change?
Making a big deal matters. It forces the government to internalize lessons, ensures those responsible understand the magnitude of their failures, and reduces the risk of repetition.
As of now, we have none of that.
Rethinking antisemitism strategy
And on another topic: The Diaspora Affairs Ministry convened an antisemitism conference in Jerusalem this week that looked very different from the usual gatherings of Jewish NGOs and sympathetic politicians pledging to do more.
Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli invited far-right European politicians – figures, for example, affiliated with France’s National Rally – with troubling pasts marked by antisemitism and, in some cases, even links to Nazi-era ideologies.
On the surface, this is unsettling. But it also cannot be dismissed out of hand. Chikli explained to me recently that his logic is to build a coalition capable of confronting radical Islam, which he sees as the primary driver of contemporary antisemitism and violence against Jews.
Is he right? The answer is not simple. But one thing is clear: the old strategies are not working. And sometimes, shaking things up has value in itself.
The writer is a co-founder of the MEAD policy forum, a senior fellow at JPPI, and a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post. His newest book is While Israel Slept.