In the coming weeks, unless a security development occurs in southern Lebanon that meets the demands of Israel and the United States, the region may enter another round of fighting – one that could severely shake the stability of the Lebanese regime and plunge the country into a bloody civil war. Such a development would push the US away from involvement in Lebanon, restore Iran’s position as the dominant power in the country, and affect the stability of the Syrian regime as well.
Israel’s hardline policy, backed by the United States, to dismantle Hezbollah’s military capabilities by the end of 2025 – according to the timetable set last August by the Lebanese government itself – is reflected both in near-daily airstrikes, including the targeted killing of Hezbollah’s chief of staff, Haytham Ali Tabatabai (to which Hezbollah has yet to respond), and in intense diplomatic pressure led by US envoys Morgan Ortagus and Tom Barrack, working closely with Saudi Prince Yazid bin Farhan and France’s Jean-Yves Le Drian.
These efforts created the conditions for the “Naqoura Mechanism” – established to manage the November 2024 ceasefire agreement between the countries – to be civilianized, and for Lebanon’s President Joseph Aoun to appoint the pro-American Simon Karim as its chair, despite fierce opposition from the Shi’ite duo of Amal and Hezbollah.
Against the backdrop of the recent war and the severe political crisis that had plagued the country for years beforehand, Lebanon has reached the edge of the abyss: accelerated emigration of strong socioeconomic groups, primarily Christians; a significant demographic shift threatening the 1943 National Pact – whose founding idea envisioned Lebanon as a state for all its sects, each enjoying near-complete autonomy; and an almost total economic dependence on external aid, which will not be provided unless Hezbollah disarms.
Polarized and paralyzed
Sectarian polarization in Lebanon today is far sharper than on the eve of the 1975 civil war, as is the strength and cohesion of the Shi’ite community. The Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc, representing the Shi’ite duo, is the loudest force in Parliament, and the 2026 parliamentary elections have already ignited a fierce dispute over electoral law reforms.
This dispute is blocking a $250 million loan intended for rehabilitating the abandoned southern villages, fueling the anger of southern residents toward the government. Conditions in the Palestinian refugee camps are also deteriorating due to institutionalized discrimination and the shrinking presence of UNRWA.
Longstanding political figures in Lebanon continue to dominate the scene, seemingly learning nothing from history. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt relentlessly undermines the legitimacy of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government and Aoun, while Christian leader Samir Geagea of the Lebanese Forces leads an aggressive lobbying campaign in Washington against Aoun, alongside an extremely hardline stance against Hezbollah.
Hezbollah and Iran, since the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, have adopted a strategic and cautious posture based on the principle of taqiyya (concealment). Hezbollah is wisely holding its fire despite the constant Israeli strikes, while simultaneously working steadily and successfully to rebuild its capabilities outside the southern region.
Iran – despite its own internal hardships – transferred roughly $1 billion to Hezbollah in 2025, along with missile components and weapons parts via newly established smuggling routes that effectively bypass US financial restrictions on al-Qard al-Hassan bank and other institutions.
Lebanon’s army – whose commander, Rodolphe Haykal, suffered recent humiliation when his Washington visit was canceled – is almost entirely dependent on US funding. Its motivation is already low, given that at least half of its personnel are Shi’ites, making it exceedingly difficult to meet American and Israeli expectations without being perceived as puppets of the US and of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
There is broad consensus that Hezbollah must not be allowed to reestablish its presence in the southern villages under any circumstances, and that Israel cannot risk a northern raid akin to the events of October 7. Yet Israel and the US must find a way to hold both ends of the rope without tearing it.
Lebanon has not had a government in decades that truly sought the country’s rehabilitation and a genuine disengagement from Iranian patronage. If such a path is not found – and the parties slip into another, more significant confrontation beyond the current level of “tolerated” targeted operations – the country may find itself in a total civil war even worse than that of 1975.
In such a scenario, the Salam-Aoun government would be exposed as powerless against an Israel acting freely within Lebanon, and would collapse quickly. Hezbollah, by contrast, would emerge from the internal conflict militarily and politically strengthened, cementing Iran’s influence over Lebanon for many years to come.
Determination is necessary – but caution is indispensable.
The writer is a Middle East expert and a former lecturer at Bar-Ilan University and Netanya Academic College.