Last week, the Knesset passed a resolution calling to apply sovereignty over Judea and Samaria – a move that echoes the century-old vision of Zionist leader Ze’ev Jabotinsky.
In 1923, Jabotinsky outlined what he considered a necessary condition for coexistence between Arabs and Jews: the “Iron Wall.” This wall was not to be understood literally: it was an allusion to Jewish deterrence, an unbreakable barrier of strength, resolve, and permanence.
Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel would never be granted willingly by the Arab world, he argued. To be accepted, it had to impose itself as a permanent reality. Only after Arab leaders had given up the idea of annihilating Zionism could negotiations become possible.
Although his ideas served as a compass for the Zionist Right and more particularly the Likud, his doctrine was never considered at its full extent for implementation.
Yet today, in post-October 7 Israel, his foresight is gaining broader understanding. Even if only symbolic for now, the Knesset’s declarative call for sovereignty, dismissed by some as a political distraction, marks a deep shift. It challenges the old “land for peace” formula together with the two-state paradigm, suggesting instead that peace might only be achievable through a stronger, bigger, and more resolute Israel.
The mere fact that “annexation” was debated at this level of governance is more than another political statement: it breaks with decades of diplomatic restraint and accommodation. The declaration’s preface could not be clearer: “Sovereignty in Judea and Samaria is an integral part of fulfilling Zionism and the national vision of the Jewish people returning to their ancestral homeland. The October 7, 2023, massacre demonstrated that the establishment of a Palestinian state poses an existential threat to Israel, its citizens, and the stability of the entire region.”
Not only does this language – as well as the rest of the declaration – re-embrace Zionism’s original project, it re-frames one of Israel’s most sensitive debates. Even the terms used to describe this territory, once part of Mandatory Palestine and annexed by Jordan after the 1948 war (“West Bank,” “disputed,” “occupied,” or “Judea and Samaria”), carry political weight.
Those who say “Judea and Samaria” have long been dismissed as nationalist fanatics. However, the Knesset’s resolution deflates this stigma and revives the notion of a Greater Israel, sidelined since 1967 and further marginalized by the Oslo Accords.
To be clear, the resolution does not call for sovereignty east of the Jordan River as in Jabotinsky’s initial plan, but it reintroduces the idea of pushing back Israel’s borders – an idea that was first rejected by Labor Zionist elites and then, for decades, by much of Israel’s establishment. Now, in light of October 7 and the war, the vision of a Greater Israel is no longer taboo.
Israel’s traditional “land-for-peace” approach, a cornerstone of Labor Zionism since the Six Day War, has been shaken to its core. The belief that compromise and territorial concessions would bring peace has not only failed, but it has done the opposite, creating fertile ground for terror to flourish.
Today, the two-state solution – long presented as a foregone conclusion by the international community as well as the Israeli Left and Center – appears not just unrealistic but self-destructive.
In this light, Jabotinsky’s Iron Wall doctrine, once the sole domain of the Right, appears less extreme. He understood that Arab acceptance of Zionism would not come through goodwill or negotiation, but through recognition that they could not defeat it. As he wrote in his 1923 Iron Wall essay, as long “as they have the least hope of being rid of us, they will refuse to yield.”
Coexistence, therefore, would become possible only when the Arabs saw the irrevocable nature of Jewish sovereignty. That realization, Jabotinsky argued, would come only through force, clarity, and unshakable resolve from the Jewish people – the Iron Wall.
Jabotinksy's doctrine and vison
Yet, Jabotinsky did not dismiss Arab nationalism. On the contrary, he took it seriously as an enduring force to be confronted directly, not appeased or ignored. He believed that the Arabs would never voluntarily give up what they considered their land. Only once Jewish sovereignty became an irreversible fact could a peaceful future begin.
His doctrine was one of confidence and not compromise. He insisted that Arabs and other minorities, if they accepted the state’s legitimacy and Jewish national character, would enjoy civil rights (though he left those rights undefined). For Jabotinsky, applying sovereignty was essential; the rest – demographics, Jewish character, culture, and education – would follow.
He believed that the Greater Israel, including both banks of the Jordan, as expressed in his famous poem “The East Bank of the Jordan” – “Two banks has the Jordan, this one is ours and so is that,” which became Betar’s motto, was the rightful home for the Jewish people.
Beyond the millennia-old Jewish aspiration, biblical tradition, and historical justice behind this vision, Jabotinsky emphasized demographic, strategic, and security imperatives. Only with such strategic depth could the Jewish State sustainably defend itself and absorb large waves of immigration.
For decades, this doctrine was dismissed as “extremist” and as an obstacle to peace, while compromise was viewed as pragmatic and morally superior. Yet Israel’s policy of territorial compromise was invariably met with rejection and violence. That illusion was shattered on October 7.
Jabotinsky saw what others refused to see. He warned Jews and the rest of the world in the 1930s about the Nazi threat, calling for urgent evacuation and resisting appeasement. But his warnings went largely unheard.
In his vision for the future Jewish state, he likewise warned of the illusion and danger of peace without strength. While Israel has indeed demonstrated incredible strength over time, through its military force, its resilience, and its hi-tech prowess, it neglected one essential element of Jabotinsky’s precept: unflinching resolve.
October 7 showed us that coexistence, still rejected by most Palestinian factions, is moving further out of reach. “From the river to the sea,” the rallying cry of Palestinianism and the sign of its uncompromising ethos, is not a call for coexistence but a call for elimination. The political solution that will emerge from this war must acknowledge that reality.
In this context, the Iron Wall doctrine no longer seems far-fetched or outdated. While the Knesset’s declaration does not call for the implementation of Jabotinsky’s full vision of Greater Israel, it lifts longstanding taboos and reframes the debate. And though it does not call for immediate measures, it compels the nation to reassess assumptions left unquestioned for too long, and to reconsider a right too hastily relinquished.
The Iron Wall was never just about force. It was about vision and the clarity to defend our legitimacy unapologetically and understand our enemies. In a post-October 7 reality, clarity of direction is needed: a clarity immune to delusion and wishful thinking. The Iron Wall may just be the historical foundation on which to recover that direction.
The Iron Wall was never just about force. It was about intellectual clarity, about the unapologetic affirmation of Jewish sovereignty, and about understanding our enemies. As it shapes its postwar future, Israel may find that Jabotinsky’s Iron Wall, with its demand for strength, vision, and unapologetic sovereignty, was not just a doctrine of the past, but the strategic clarity it presently needs.
The writer holds a PhD in cultural studies from Tel Aviv University. Her research focuses on post-Holocaust and Jewish literature.