The announcement that Hamas has agreed to a plan for implementing the next stages of US President Donald Trump’s Gaza peace initiative is potentially a significant diplomatic development in Gaza.

If implemented, the agreement could lead to Hamas relinquishing its weapons, an Israeli withdrawal from part of Gaza, the deployment of an International Stabilization Force, and the assumption of governance by the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG).

However, history shows that agreements often lack a “trust but verify” aspect. There are at least five major challenges that will determine whether this plan succeeds or joins the long list of ambitious peace initiatives that did not live up to their goals.

Verifying Hamas’s disarmament

The most problematic obstacle could be verification. Hamas has spent decades building a terrorist arsenal. Its weapons include rifles, explosives, anti-tank missiles, rockets, drones, intelligence infrastructure and an extensive tunnel network.

The terrorist group, along with other groups in Gaza, has also shown it can rebuild its capabilities after successive wars.

Palestinian Hamas terrorists stand guard at a site as Hamas says it continues to search for the bodies of deceased hostages, in Beit Lahiya in the northern Gaza Strip December 3, 2025.
Palestinian Hamas terrorists stand guard at a site as Hamas says it continues to search for the bodies of deceased hostages, in Beit Lahiya in the northern Gaza Strip December 3, 2025. (credit: REUTERS/STRINGER)

Announcing that weapons will be decommissioned does not answer the central question: who will verify that weapons have actually been surrendered?

The plan envisions an International Verification Committee, but inspections in conflict zones are difficult. Hamas could attempt to hide portions of its arsenal or transfer weapons to smaller allied terrorist factions. Even if the overwhelming majority of weapons are surrendered, the remaining stockpiles could undermine the entire process.

For Israel, verification will likely be the defining issue.

The sequencing of Israeli withdrawal

The agreement links Israeli withdrawal directly to Hamas’s decommissioning process. This sounds straightforward on paper but is much more complicated in practice.

If Hamas claims that Israel has not withdrawn quickly enough, implementation could stall. It will use this as an excuse to create a crisis. If Israel believes disarmament is incomplete, it may refuse to redeploy.

The plan attempts to solve this by requiring both processes to move in parallel under international supervision.

Nevertheless, almost every previous Israeli-Palestinian agreement has encountered disputes over sequencing. The US will have to keep the ball moving, a challenge when the US is also focused on Lebanon and Iran.

Can the Palestinian NCAG actually govern Gaza?

The NCAG has spent months preparing for this moment. It has pledged to restore public services, improve humanitarian conditions and rebuild institutions. Governing Gaza is far more difficult than administering it on paper.

The territory’s infrastructure has been devastated by years of conflict. Electricity, water, hospitals, schools and transportation networks all require enormous investment.

Civilians need to be able to move out of the Hamas-run area, and the NCAG will need to establish legitimacy among Palestinians while simultaneously working with Israel, the US and international donors.

If Gazans perceive the new administration as ineffective or externally imposed, it could quickly lose public support.

The committee therefore faces not only an administrative challenge but also a political one.

The International Stabilization Force

The plan depends heavily on the International Stabilization Force (ISF).

The ISF is expected to include personnel from countries such as Morocco, Kosovo and Albania, with additional states expected to participate.

Their mission may extend beyond traditional peacekeeping. They will help provide security, facilitate humanitarian assistance and support the transition to Palestinian governance. It is not clear how they will operate. They need more than a handful of troops.

This will not be an easy mission.

International peacekeeping forces have struggled elsewhere in the region. Lebanon’s UNIFIL mission illustrates the problem. Despite decades of deployment, Hezbollah was able to expand its military infrastructure throughout southern Lebanon.

The new force will need a much stronger mandate than previous international missions if it is to prevent armed groups from re-emerging.

Without credible enforcement powers, stabilization risks becoming symbolic rather than operational.

The regional political environment

The Gaza plan does not exist in isolation. The Middle East is undergoing one of its most significant strategic transformations in decades.

The US continues to face a crisis with Iran. Israeli focus remains divided among Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Iran-backed militias remain active across the region, while negotiations continue involving Lebanon and possibly also Syria.

Any major regional crisis could derail implementation.

Iran has consistently opposed efforts that weaken Hamas or reduce the influence of its regional network. Even if Tehran does not directly intervene, groups aligned with Iran could seek to undermine the agreement through violence or political pressure.

At the same time, regional actors that support the road map, including Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and the United States, will have to remain engaged for months, perhaps years.

Diplomatic attention cannot disappear once the agreement is signed. Meanwhile, some countries that back Hamas will try to keep it relevant in Gaza and the West Bank.