There appears to be a disconnect between what Beirut, Washington, and Jerusalem expect from the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in proposed pilot zones in southern Lebanon. On paper, all three sides appear to support an increased role for the Lebanese Army. However, they seem to have very different ideas about what that deployment is supposed to accomplish.
On July 20, the US State Department said, “Today, pilot zone operations began in the villages of Froun, Srifa, and Zawtar al-Gharbiya in accordance with the Trilateral Framework [Agreement] and under the auspices of the Military Coordination Group for Lebanon. This milestone is a direct outcome of last week’s discussions between Israel and Lebanon in Rome.
“The United States will continue working closely with both parties to implement the Framework to a successful conclusion.”
Lebanon’s President Joseph Aoun is in the US for meetings with US President Donald Trump and the State Department.
Beirut appears primarily focused on using the pilot zones to secure an Israeli withdrawal or redeployment. The concept is clear from Lebanon’s point of view. The LAF deploys soldiers and vehicles, demonstrates that it has a presence on the ground, and then hopes the IDF will keep leaving new areas. Beirut can then say it has fulfilled its obligations.
There is one major problem with this approach: Hezbollah is barely mentioned by Beirut or its supporters. It is always seen as the “he who shall not be named,” like in Harry Potter. The United States appears to have a more ambitious objective. Washington has invested in the Lebanese Army over the years. The goal of the US is for the Lebanese state to restore its sovereignty.
That means the army should actually do what an army is supposed to do. It should control territory, secure borders, prevent Hezbollah from operating, and ensure that the state has a so-called monopoly on weapons. That means preventing Hezbollah from stockpiling so many weapons that it basically supplants the army in terms of its powers. In southern Lebanon, this inevitably means dealing with Hezbollah.
This is where the pilot-zone concept comes into play. It is designed to provide a “trust but verify” concept where the LAF can certify it has actually done something. If the LAF demonstrates that it can secure one limited area and prevent Hezbollah from returning, then the model can theoretically be expanded to a second area, and then a third.
Eventually, this could provide a pathway toward what Beirut wants: restoring Lebanese sovereignty across the south.
Israel appears to have a somewhat different, more limited perspective, informed by past experience and a cynical outlook that is natural for the region. Jerusalem is laser-focused on keeping Hezbollah away from the border and preventing the terror group from rebuilding the infrastructure that enabled it to threaten northern Israel. Israel is also likely deeply skeptical that the LAF will ever seriously confront Hezbollah.
Nevertheless, Israel may be willing to give the pilot-zone concept time. If it works, then Hezbollah could be pushed away from the border without requiring the IDF to maintain a permanent presence. If it fails, Israel will eventually be able to tell Washington that Lebanon was given an opportunity and that the experiment did not work.
This brings us back to the central problem. Beirut does not appear to define success in terms of removing Hezbollah. Its messaging tends to focus instead on getting the IDF to withdraw or “redeploy.”
We have seen this cycle before.
For decades, the presence of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the LAF provided a kind of fig leaf in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah could continue to operate while everyone pretended that the presence of international peacekeepers and the Lebanese Army meant that the area was secure.
The logic became circular. UNIFIL was there; therefore, Hezbollah supposedly wasn’t there. UNIFIL didn’t report seeing Hezbollah, and the LAF didn’t find the terror group, so Hezbollah supposedly didn’t exist in the area.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah built up one of the largest arsenals possessed by a terrorist army group in the world. It constructed infrastructure throughout southern Lebanon and positioned itself for a war with Israel. This shell game went on for years.
The issue today is that the pilot zones could become another cycle of fig leaf and failure. The LAF could deploy some vehicles and personnel to show off; the IDF could be pressured to leave, and then everyone could declare success. Hezbollah would simply remain behind the scenes.
It is worth recalling that the fundamental problem in Lebanon has never been the absence of Lebanese institutions on paper. Lebanon has an army, a government, a president, a parliament, and security forces. The problem has been that terrorists, backed by Iran, have been allowed to operate outside those institutions and maintain their own military infrastructure.
The pilot zones therefore need a clear definition of success. The question should not be whether the IDF leaves. The question is what happens the day after it “redeploys.” Who actually controls the territory? Who possesses weapons there? Can Hezbollah members return? Can the group rebuild positions, move weapons, or establish observation posts? Will the LAF stop them if they do?
If the answer is that the Lebanese state controls the territory and Hezbollah cannot return with weapons and infrastructure, then the pilot zones could represent a new breakthrough. They could become the beginning of the return of the Lebanese state to southern Lebanon.
If, however, the LAF presence merely becomes another fig leaf, then nothing has fundamentally changed. Lebanon will have replaced the old UNIFIL shell game with a new pilot-zone shell game.