LEBANON SUCCEEDS IN SEPARATING ITS PATH FROM IRAN
An-Nahar, Lebanon, April 15
Hezbollah’s attempt to link Lebanon’s negotiating track to the Iranian one has failed.
In reality, the effort came close to a full-fledged political and security coup, especially since the party and the forces operating under its umbrella – parties, movements, and political figures from different backgrounds – were part of a coordinated push aimed at reasserting control over Lebanon’s national decision-making.
In practical terms, it was clear that mobilizing the street was not a spontaneous political-security development, but part of a coordinated operation between the “Shi’ite duo,” translated on the ground into an effective takeover of Beirut, leveraging the demographic and security shifts created by the war.
The move began with pressure campaigns in the street and media to fold the Lebanese file into US-Iran negotiations, allowing Tehran to carry the demand for a ceasefire in Lebanon as part of a broader deal.
This required simultaneous pressure on the government domestically and at the negotiating table in Islamabad.
Yet the effort quickly faltered when both the president and prime minister took a decisive stand, with President Joseph Aoun opening the cabinet session by rejecting any attempt to negotiate on Lebanon’s behalf.
This was reinforced by the army’s deployment in the capital under the banner of turning Beirut into a demilitarized city, especially after officials realized the extent of Hezbollah’s infiltration – fighters, cadres, leadership figures, and weapons spread across residential neighborhoods.
The protests at the entrances to the Grand Serail were not simply about holding Prime Minister Nawaf Salam accountable, but part of a gradual attempt to seize the capital by mobilizing a pro-party base, exploiting the absence of Beirut’s traditional Sunni component, and the silence of its leadership.
Hezbollah’s failure to secure the Lebanese card was compounded by the launch of direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations – even under fire in the South – cementing a clear separation between the Lebanese and Iranian tracks.
The Lebanese state acted wisely in enforcing this separation, especially as the Iranian track itself stalled in Islamabad and may yet return to open confrontation.
Meanwhile, developments in the battle for Bint Jbeil suggest that its possible capture by Israeli forces would mark a turning point in weakening Hezbollah’s military power and further eroding its position within Lebanon’s political order, despite its continued possession of tools of violence.
The party has lost its strategic depth in Syria, its logistical connection to Iran has become far more difficult, and its human and material losses are immense.
– Ali Hamada
WASHINGTON AND TEHRAN ON THE EDGE
El Watan, Egypt, April 14
The latest round of US-Iran negotiations in Islamabad was not a negotiation in the true sense, but rather a stage for each side to showcase what it claims to have achieved after the 40-day war, and to reinforce a narrative of victory before domestic audiences.
Each party arrived bound by the image it had built for its public – an image that leaves little room for early or painful concessions, especially after mobilizing rhetoric centered on resilience and triumph.
From the outset, this made meaningful negotiation unlikely, with both sides presenting fixed demands rather than engaging in genuine dialogue.
More important than the failure of talks, however, is the shift in the conflict’s center of gravity – from the nuclear file to the far more sensitive and consequential issue of the Strait of Hormuz.
The war has led Iran to rediscover its most powerful leverage: not its nuclear program, but its ability to influence global trade and energy flows through control of this vital chokepoint.
This realization has turned the Strait of Hormuz into the central arena of the conflict, linking any political settlement directly to its future.
In response, the United States has moved to impose a naval blockade on Iranian ports following the collapse of talks, targeting vessels entering and leaving in an effort to choke exports – particularly oil – and force Tehran back to negotiations under greater pressure.
This marks a decisive shift from political pressure to economic and maritime confrontation, with consequences extending far beyond the immediate parties.
Rising oil prices, disrupted supply chains, and higher transport costs place the global economy squarely within the conflict’s reach.
More broadly, this signals the emergence of a new phase of geopolitical competition: wars over maritime chokepoints.
Historically, control over sea routes has defined global power, but the current moment adds a new dimension, where even non-state actors can disrupt trade by exploiting narrow geographic bottlenecks.
The key question now is whether the region is moving closer to war or peace.
The answer lies somewhere in between.
The blockade raises tensions and risks escalation, yet it may also serve as leverage to bring Iran back to the table.
For now, we are in a dangerous middle phase – what might be described as “armed peace” – where pressure builds, and escalation continues, even as channels for negotiation remain quietly open.
– Mohamed Mostafa Aboshama