Voices from the Arab press: Pope Leo and the Shi'ites

Pope Leo XIV’s visit to Lebanon offered a much-needed lift to Christian morale after years of hardship and tragedy that have weighed heavily on the country. His arrival came amid sweeping regional upheaval, reaffirming the enduring role of Christianity within Lebanon’s social fabric at a moment when Christian communities are shrinking across much of the Middle East, including Lebanon itself.

In his address, the pope underscored the importance of remaining rooted in the country – not out of resignation, but as an expression of faith in Lebanon’s capacity to recover. He delivered his most pointed message to those in power, urging them to place peace above all else and stressing that peace is now the only viable path to save Lebanon. His appeal was not a rhetorical flourish but the guiding theme of the entire visit. The word “peace” echoed throughout his speeches, repeated dozens of times, emphasizing the urgency of ushering the country into a new phase.

Peace offers the most stable environment for Christians to live securely and maintain their historic role, and it is the essential means of halting the demographic decline they face in Lebanon and across the region. It is no surprise that the pope confronted this issue directly and without equivocation. The visit broke a long-standing silence – not only among politicians but also among ordinary citizens. Peace is now being discussed openly and assertively, no longer in hushed tones or laden with political ambiguity. The pope effectively removed the pursuit of peace from the realm of “national taboos,” granting Lebanese across the political spectrum renewed legitimacy to elevate peace as an urgent national priority.

The conversation surrounding peace today is fundamentally different from what it had been just days before the visit. While “peace” may be the pope’s central message to Christians, for Shi’ites it represents an existential necessity rather than a political preference. Decades of violence and armed confrontation – regardless of the rhetoric used to justify them – have brought devastating loss, destruction, and displacement to Shi’ite communities, especially in the south. Hezbollah’s most recent military escalation has proved particularly catastrophic, inflicting levels of destruction on southern towns unseen since the founding of the Lebanese state.

This is no longer a familiar cycle of “destruction followed by reconstruction.” What is unfolding today exceeds all previous rounds, reaching the level of an existential threat, with a very real risk that these towns could be emptied entirely if Hezbollah, backed by Iran, continues on its rigid, unyielding course. In this context, the pope’s call for peace extends far beyond Christian communities; it echoes the message that [Grand Ayatollah] Ali al-Sistani directed to Iranian leaders, urging them to act before the Shi’ite community slides into irreversible collapse.

“Blessed are the peacemakers” is not simply a biblical verse the pope invoked; it functions as a political imperative – a plea for leaders with the courage to safeguard the Christian presence and its national role. Just as urgently, it is a call to save the Shi’ite community itself and stop the relentless cycle that continues to consume its people. In a country trapped between the hammer of war and the anvil of systemic collapse, peace is no longer a religious slogan or a moral exhortation; it is the final lifeline for the survival of all Lebanese, without exception. – Marwan El Amine

Western political discourse often promotes the notion that Israel stands as a democratic beacon in the Middle East, highlighting its legislative institutions, periodic elections, and diverse press. Yet this framing relies on a superficial understanding of democracy, overlooking the deeper standards by which liberal systems are judged – equal citizenship, universal rights for all under the state’s authority, adherence to the rule of law, and the rejection of ethnic or religious privilege.

When the Israeli case is evaluated through these criteria, the distance between the polished narrative and the political and legal reality becomes stark, casting serious doubt on claims that Israel maintains a robust democratic record. The constitutional formula defining the state as “Jewish and democratic” embodies an inherent contradiction. The state’s Jewish character grants collective rights and exclusive political privileges to Jews, conflicting with the core democratic principle of equal citizenship.

This tension was sharpened by the 2018 Nation-State Law, which declared that the right to self-determination in Israel belongs “exclusively to the Jewish people,” diminishing the political standing of Palestinian citizens within the 1948 borders and curtailing their role in shaping the state’s national identity and political project. Moreover, the automatic citizenship available to any Jew worldwide – contrasted against the denial of the right of return or family reunification to Palestinians born in the country – illustrates a discriminatory legal order at odds with modern democratic norms and relegates Palestinian citizens to an inferior civic status in their own homeland.

Meanwhile, “admissions committees” in Jewish towns routinely exclude Arab applicants under the guise of “cultural incompatibility,” entrenching national segregation and turning discrimination into an openly sanctioned system. Budget gaps between Jewish and Arab schools continue to widen, degrading the quality of education available to Palestinian children within the Green Line. These inequalities become even more severe in the occupied Palestinian territories, where Palestinian schools in the West Bank and Gaza face strict limits on construction and expansion and are periodically damaged during military operations, while schools in Jewish settlements receive generous state funding – a clear indication of institutionalized discrimination.

Defenders of “Israeli democracy” often point to the presence of Arab parties in the Knesset as proof of inclusivity, but such representation has limited influence. Arab parties have rarely been accepted as partners in governing coalitions, as many Jewish parties insist that the state’s Jewish character restricts substantive Palestinian participation in decision-making. Attempts by the Central Elections Committee to disqualify Arab candidates on the grounds that they “deny the Jewishness of the state” recur frequently, accompanied by political and media campaigns aimed at delegitimizing Arab representation and constraining its effectiveness.

Major human rights organizations – including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch – have described these conditions as forms of apartheid, given the system’s structured preference for one population over another and the resulting violations of Palestinians’ rights to movement, education, health, and property. These include the presence of widespread checkpoints that impede Palestinians from reaching workplaces, schools, or hospitals, while settlers move freely. Violations extend as well to the treatment of Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons, where reports document sleep deprivation, psychological and physical abuse, denial of family visits, and deliberate medical neglect – practices that violate international conventions prohibiting torture and degrading treatment.

Multiple investigations have also found that Palestinian children face harsh interrogations and mistreatment, raising further alarm about the state’s adherence to human rights norms. Concerns about these practices are not limited to advocacy groups; they have reached international judicial bodies. In South Africa’s case before the International Court of Justice alleging violations of Israel’s obligations under the Genocide Convention, the court issued binding provisional measures in January 2024 requiring Israel to prevent genocidal acts, curtail incitement, allow humanitarian aid, and preserve evidence.

Domestic political dynamics further complicate this picture. Netanyahu’s government includes hard-line figures like Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, whose records of exclusionary policies toward Palestinians, endorsement of settlement expansion, and rejection of a two-state solution reflect an entrenched shift toward nationalist extremism. Their prominence signals an erosion of liberal norms and a governing agenda shaped by the interests of narrow sectarian blocs at the expense of minority rights. The internal crisis sparked by the 2022 judicial overhaul likewise exposed the fragility of Israel’s institutional checks and balances; notably, Palestinians were almost entirely absent from the debate, despite the direct implications for their lives.

Prominent Israeli figures have voiced concerns about these trends: Former prime minister Ehud Barak warned that Israel is “on the brink of an abyss, sliding into an undemocratic system,” while former president Reuven Rivlin cautioned that growing polarization and militarized political rhetoric threaten the state’s future. Former defense minister Moshe Ya’alon argued that far-Right policies are pushing the country toward a tribal, religious model of governance, not a democratic one. Writers like Amos Oz and David Grossman have long warned that religious nationalism and continued control over another people will erode Israel’s moral foundations.

Former Supreme Court presidents and jurists have likewise condemned efforts to weaken the judiciary as a “coup against Israel’s constitutional order.” Taken together – structural discrimination within the Green Line, military domination of occupied territories, extensive documentation by human rights organizations, international judicial scrutiny, the rise of nationalist-religious movements, and internal warnings – the evidence makes clear that the portrayal of Israel as an “oasis of democracy” collapses under serious examination. The system combines ethno-democratic governance for Jews, diminished rights for Palestinian citizens, and undemocratic rule over Palestinians living under occupation.

Understanding these realities is necessary to grasp the nature of the conflict and move beyond simplistic narratives that obscure its political and moral stakes. The claim that Israel serves as a regional model of democracy, therefore, falters when held against the actual standards of liberal governance and human rights. The reality reflects a double structure: full rights for Jewish citizens alongside diminished rights for Palestinians within the Green Line, and undemocratic military rule over Palestinians in the occupied territories, sustained through institutional discrimination, rights violations, rising religious-nationalist influence, internal warnings from leading Israeli figures, and ongoing international legal action.

Over the past three months, US forces have carried out 22 military strikes on boats in international waters in the Caribbean and Pacific, resulting in the deaths of 83 people allegedly involved in drug trafficking. The most contentious episode was a pair of strikes on September 2, when an initial attack left two survivors, prompting a second strike to ensure no one remained alive.

A military confrontation with Venezuela could become a serious political crisis for the Trump administration if it fails to secure a swift victory over Maduro. Regardless of the outcome, scrutiny will grow over the broader wisdom of US military intervention in Latin America, particularly as Washington remains deeply engaged in operations across the Middle East and Africa, including in Yemen, Iraq, and Somalia. Trump has recently threatened to use force in Nigeria to counter what he describes as “terrorism directed against the Christian community there.”

Such operations are far from what many Trump voters expected; their embrace of the “America First” slogan was grounded in the belief that US resources should be devoted to domestic challenges rather than foreign entanglements. Trump now faces a difficult dilemma regarding his defense secretary, as pressure mounts for him to dismiss Hegseth. Critics within the Republican Party contend that Hegseth is temperamentally unfit for the job and has fostered serious tensions with both civilian and military officials at the Pentagon. Should fighting erupt in Venezuela and American forces suffer heavy casualties, Hegseth’s position could become untenable.

In the early stages of his second term, Trump cannot afford to project weakness, and he has already shown a willingness to remove even favored cabinet members when they become liabilities. Other senior officials also under fire include FBI Director Kash Patel, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, and Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr., each facing widespread criticism for their performance and for creating what staff describe as a hostile working environment.

Administrative turbulence is hardly unusual in government, but what sets Hegseth, Patel, Gabbard, and Kennedy apart is that all faced intense opposition from the start. Their confirmation hearings were bruising, and they won approval only by razor-thin margins, buoyed by Trump’s heavy-handed intervention and the reluctant support of Republican senators who believed a newly inaugurated president deserved some benefit of the doubt.

It is no coincidence that Israel targeted Haytham Ali Tabatabai, the Hezbollah military commander recently assassinated in Beirut. He was no ordinary figure by any measure; rather, he embodied a determination to directly oversee Hezbollah’s reconstruction. Tabatabai was transferred from Yemen to Lebanon to help lead Hezbollah in what its backers envisioned as a post-Israel phase, following Israel’s elimination of much of the organization’s senior leadership.

Recent statements by Naim Qassem, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, shed light on the role the organization and its patrons continue to pursue, both through the group itself and through figures like Tabatabai – well beyond Lebanon’s borders and outside what used to be the recognized “rules of engagement.” Those rules effectively vanished after Hamas’s Al-Aqsa Flood attack of October 7. Hassan Nasrallah’s successor acknowledged that Tabatabai, killed in Beirut, had been in Yemen from 2015 to 2024. He also fought in Syria in defense of the minority regime that Bashar Assad inherited from his father. Hezbollah’s direct involvement in the war against the Syrian people only deepened hostilities between most Syrians and a Lebanese faction that had fully aligned itself with a wider expansionist agenda.

Only weeks after that interview, in the fall of 2004, the first of six wars between the Houthis and the Yemeni army erupted, continuing until 2010 – just months before the Muslim Brotherhood capitalized on the Arab Spring to topple Saleh’s regime in February 2011. What stands out about the dates Naim Qassem cited regarding Tabatabai’s role in Yemen is that his most intensive activity began in 2015, after the Houthis captured Sana’a on September 21, 2014.

This does not imply Hezbollah was uninvolved before that point, but rather that its efforts became more concentrated on consolidating Houthi control of the capital. Nor does it suggest that Tabatabai – along with others – was previously uninterested in Yemen. From this perspective, it was necessary for someone of Tabatabai’s stature to devote himself almost entirely to Yemen, given the developments that unfolded following the Houthi takeover of Sana’a. More importantly, his presence helps explain the push – either directly or through Hezbollah – to accelerate the consolidation of power to a degree that effectively eliminated any other Yemeni actor’s influence over political decision-making in the north.

It is no minor detail that Tabatabai was in Sana’a during the tense period leading up to the rift between Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthis in August 2017, a crisis that peaked when Saleh publicly rejected Houthi dominance in December 2017. Within days, the Houthis assassinated him, ending a partnership that no longer aligned with Abdul-Malik al-Houthi’s objectives.

Hezbollah has played multiple roles outside Lebanon’s borders, all part of a strategy implemented either by the group or by those directing it – roles carried out by figures such as Tabatabai in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. Yemen was especially important because of its geographic position at the heart of the Arabian Peninsula. Its transformation into a missile launch point stressed a clear intent to pressure the Gulf Cooperation Council states one by one. The end of Tabatabai, in the manner it occurred, was no ordinary outcome. It signaled the collapse of an entire project – one that ultimately proved unworkable.