Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s rule has sparked widespread violence, including massacres against the Alawite and Druze communities, exposing deep divisions within Syria’s minority groups. As Sharaa struggles to maintain control, his vision for a unified Syria clashes with the growing demand for decentralization and autonomy, with various ethnic factions – backed by international players – threatening the regime’s survival.
Sharaa hoped that everything in Syria would go according to his original plan. He waited in the Idlib province, in the country’s northwest, under Turkish protection for about nine years since the beginning of the civil war, and in late 2024, he took advantage of the war in Ukraine and Hezbollah’s war against Israel to overthrow the Assad regime in a matter of days, with Russia and Iran’s hands tied.
The next step was to take control of the whole country, which seemed like an easy task since, unlike Assad and the top officials of the previous regime, who were from the Alawite minority, Sharaa represents the majority Sunni sect, which makes up about 70% of the population. So, what’s the problem?
Sharaa’s men were not content with mere control; they sought revenge. Immediately after seizing power in Damascus in December 2024, massacres against the Alawite community in Latakia, Tartus, and Baniyas began to multiply. Next in line were the Druze.
In April, Sharaa’s men carried out a massacre of Druze in the suburbs of Damascus. The massacre resumed, with greater intensity, in July in the southern province of Sweida. This time, the killings only stopped after the intervention of the IDF.
Senior officials of the new regime repeatedly stated that they had not given orders to carry out these acts and even pledged to prosecute the rebels.
But the picture is clear: Sharaa is unable to control the bearded savages he brought with him from Idlib.
MOREOVER, IF he does punish the criminals, he will severely harm the jihadist camp most loyal to his regime. While the Alawites unanimously oppose Sharaa’s rule, the Druze camp appears to be divided.
The camp represented by Sheikh Laith al-Balous believes in talks with Sharaa, thinking the Druze have no choice but to live in the new Syria. This camp is supported by the Druze in Lebanon, led by Walid Jumblatt, and prefers to maintain ongoing contact with the regime in Damascus.
On the other hand, there is the camp led by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who, like the Alawites, completely rejects Sharaa’s rule. This group is supported by the Druze in Israel. From Hijri’s perspective, Sharaa represents a dangerous jihadist movement that sees the Druze (and Alawites) as infidels.
There is a lot of truth in this view. The Salafi ideology of most of Sharaa’s men is indeed based on the writings of the Hanbali (the strictest school of thought in Sunni Islam) jurist Ibn Taymiyyah from the 14th century, who ruled that the Alawites (then called Nusayris) and the Druze are infidel sects who have left the fold of Islam and, as traitors, their punishment is death.
The Kurds observe and learn
Although the Kurdish community is largely Sunni, it has a bitter past as a persecuted minority. Furthermore, the Kurds have fought more than any other group against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and Sharaa’s men remind them of the monsters of the Islamic State.
Indeed, ideologically, the differences between ISIS and Sharaa’s Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (an al-Qaeda offshoot) are not great. Additionally, the Kurds are very suspicious of the regime in Damascus, mainly due to its close ties with their main enemy – Turkey, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
At the end of February, Sharaa was still very optimistic about the Kurdish issue. A Syrian National Dialogue Conference was held in Damascus on February 24-25, with the participation of most of the country’s ethnic groups. The conference supposedly heralded a new Syria of tolerance and inter-ethnic reconciliation. On March 10, Sharaa even met with Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces.
The two parties agreed on the integration of the SDF (more than 100,000 fighters) into the new Syrian army. However, in practice, the implementation of the agreement was delayed and appears to have been frozen.
The horrific events in the Alawite and Druze regions greatly deterred the Kurds. They watched as the Alawites (the soldiers of the previous regime) handed over their weapons and saw the shortage of weapons that the Druze militias suffered from, and they understood very well the significance of handing over weapons or giving up the independence that the Kurds currently enjoy in the north of the country.
THE APPARENT relationship between the regime in Damascus and the Kurds was shattered in August, following the holding of the Al-Hasakah Conference in the Kurdish Al-Hasakah province, attended by Abdi and senior Kurdish officials, Druze leader Hikmat al-Hijri, and the head of the Syrian Alawite Council, Sheikh Ghazal Ghazal.
The conference was also attended by other minorities who now feel threatened: Christians, Turkmens, Armenians, Circassians, and more. The participants’ goal was to arouse international sympathy and maintain joint pressure on Damascus regarding the existence of a democratic, egalitarian, and liberal Syria.
The main idea of the conference was decentralization. This meant that Syria would exist as a federation, in which each sect would maintain autonomy under loose control from Damascus. This is the Sharaa regime’s nightmare – the disintegration of Syria into regions: Druze in the south, Alawite in the west, and Kurdish in the north.
In practice, this means that the regime in Damascus will only have direct control over about 60% of the country.
Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani was quick to reject the conference’s demands outright, emphasizing that all sects in Syria will exist solely under the framework of a united Syria.
A difficult predicament in Syria
Sharaa is now in a difficult predicament. He wants complete control over all of Syria, but in the six months of his rule, he has lost the trust of the minorities.
Arab countries that support the Syrian regime accuse Israel of trying to subvert Damascus to weaken it, as is clearly reflected in the Arab media. Turkey hopes to use the new government as a protectorate, which will allow it to strategically control Syria politically.
Qatar, which hopes to gain a significant share of economic control over Syria, is also concerned about the situation.
Al Jazeera commentator Ramadan Bursa recently published an editorial titled “Syria faces a very dangerous situation.” In his article, he explained that a federation is not suitable for a weak and unstable regime, like Syria, and that a federal regime can only exist in rich, stable, and successful countries like the US, Britain, and Germany. Bursa warned that a federal regime is very dangerous for Syria’s future and could lead to its weakening and even disintegration.
The regime in Damascus is now on a collision course with all the country’s minorities. While the Alawites are defenseless, the Druze are backed by Israel, and the Kurds constitute a large, armed force that still enjoys a kind of American patronage.
In recent days, the regime in Damascus has been publishing lists of detainees, alleged lawbreakers, who participated in the massacre against the Alawites and Druze. But it is doubtful whether these arrests will restore trust in the regime. From the perspective of the minorities, Sharaa’s security forces controlling their territories is frightening and threatening. Syria’s regime is in real danger of crumbling.