The war in Gaza has been a sobering preview of the future of armed conflict. For Western militaries, the IDF experience provides lessons that are both urgent and uncomfortable.
Urban combat is no longer just a sideshow. From Mosul to Mariupol, and now Gaza, cities have become the new battlegrounds.
Hamas’s October 7 attack and Israel’s subsequent counteroffensive forced the IDF into fighting block by block against a well-prepared, irregular enemy embedded in dense civilian urban areas.
What followed was a case study in adaptation under fire – something Western forces must examine closely.
Adaptable warfare
First, the IDF demonstrated the importance of agility. Israel did not start the war with a perfect plan. It developed new command structures during the conflict, such as a dedicated headquarters for subterranean warfare, and enabled junior commanders to innovate on the spot.
This swift “transformation in contact” is something NATO forces, with their bureaucratic layers, find difficult to replicate. In a future fight in a Baltic or Middle Eastern city, the side that learns and adapts most quickly will prevail.
Second, the role of technology has been clarified.
Gaza has dispelled the false dichotomy between “hi-tech” and “mass.” Precision ISR systems (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), active protection systems, loitering munitions, and drones mattered – only because Israel deployed them on a large scale and integrated them with infantry, armor, and engineers. At the same time, personnel, logistics, and endurance remained vital. Gaza’s lesson is not to abandon mass for exquisite technology but to combine both.
Third, civilian protection and information warfare have become crucial. Hamas embedded itself in civilian areas, using human shields for propaganda purposes. Israel responded with evacuation notices, legal advice alongside military units, and quick release of evidence to refute false claims, such as the Al-Ahli Hospital explosion.
Despite these efforts, the extensive civilian suffering undermined international support. The message for Western militaries is clear: Protecting civilians is not just a moral duty – it is a strategic necessity. Failing to control civilian harm and the narratives around it can damage legitimacy more quickly than battlefield losses.
Asymmetric conflict
Finally, logistics and sustainment proved just as crucial as tactics. The IDF fired 90,000 shells in the initial weeks of the war, using munitions at unsustainable rates. Bulldozers, once considered niche equipment, became frontline assets for breaching barricades and clearing tunnels. Medical evacuation within the first hour following a traumatic injury – the “golden hour” – saved numerous Israeli lives.
Western armies must prepare for the extraordinary consumption, complexity, and danger involved in resupplying troops in urban combat. Without secure supply chains and forward medical infrastructure, even the best-trained units will struggle.
Of course, not every Israeli approach can or should be replicated. NATO cannot assume uncontested skies or face an enemy that holds hundreds of hostages in an asymmetric conflict. However, ignoring Gaza’s lessons would be a much bigger mistake.
The world is becoming more urban, enemies are observing, and future conflicts will be fought under the watch of both drones and smartphones. Gaza has demonstrated what it takes to succeed in such a setting: quick adaptation, integrated combined-arms tactics, disciplined information warfare and, most importantly, the ability to fight city by city while maintaining legitimacy.
Western militaries cannot afford to wait for their own “October 7” to start learning. The time to absorb Gaza’s lessons is now.■
Andrew Fox is a retired British army officer and research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.