A key lesson of the Gaza war is that “even extensive efforts to reduce collateral damage can lead to a loss of diplomatic support if the information environment is not actively managed,” according to a think tank report.
In “Tactical Lessons From Gaza” by Andrew Fox, a research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society who also served for 16 years in the Parachute Regiment of the British Army, the report homes in on that “Gaza has illustrated how failing to swiftly address the information domain can undermine military successes and even limit operational freedom.”
According to the report, “Israeli officials conceded that they were caught off guard by how swiftly they lost the ‘information high ground’ online in the early days.”
Fox is clearly sympathetic to Israel’s narrative and critical of the global media for often slanting its coverage toward Hamas’s narrative, but he makes it clear where he thinks Jerusalem made errors that the West should avoid.
For example, if a Western country is stuck in a conflict against a terrorist or asymmetric adversary who tries to delegitimize Western military force by inflating war crimes allegations, the report suggests that “Western forces might consider inviting (or at least not barring) credible neutral observers or embedded journalists” to the battle zone.
During the second Battle of Fallujah (Iraq 2004), the report noted that “US forces embedded journalists to showcase the care they took in fighting insurgents in a city. Of course, this can backfire if something adverse happens on camera, but transparency can build trust that ‘they’re not hiding anything.’”
In contrast, Fox wrote, “The Israeli ban on journalists reporting freely in Gaza is understandable due to the well-documented risk of coercion/harm to journalists by Hamas from previous conflicts. However, the IDF may have significantly benefited from more journalistic embeds with their own troops.
“Israel’s decision to bar journalists from independently entering the Gaza Strip during the war stems primarily from a legitimate safety concern, but has indeed led to the accusation of ‘hiding things,’” Fox remarked.
Further, “Israel has been repeatedly accused of ‘targeting journalists,’ particularly when media personnel were killed during firefights or airstrikes. These accusations, often amplified without full context (ignoring the well-documented terror links of many ‘journalists’ in Gaza), have placed the IDF in a bind: allow access and risk allegations of war crimes when journalists are inevitably harmed, or deny access and appear secretive and controlling.”
Fox concluded on this point, “While the logic of exclusion is understandable, Israel’s approach was excessively binary. A near-complete denial of access undermined transparency, fueled adversarial narratives, and allowed misinformation to spread unchecked. A more nuanced solution would have been to permit limited, controlled access under clear conditions.”
He added, “This could include carefully screened embed programs, escorted convoys into humanitarian zones, and a transparent, nonpartisan media accreditation process that involves both friendly and critical outlets.”
Journalists still not allowed to enter Gaza
In contrast, Israel continues to prevent journalists from visiting Gaza other than in highly scripted visits, even three months after the October ceasefire.
Separate from the question of how to integrate journalists into battle zone coverage, the report also discussed that a “key lesson is the importance of speed and adaptability in strategic communications. Western militaries typically have layers of clearance for releasing information, which can be too slow in the era of social media.”
“Western forces should establish rapid response teams within their public affairs or information operations units to disseminate verified information within minutes of an incident. This may involve delegating authority to on-scene commanders or IO officers to post updates on official channels without navigating the entire chain of command for approval, provided there is prior guidance on what is acceptable to say,” stated the report.
According to Fox, “This approach carries risks, but being preemptively truthful is preferable to constantly playing catch-up to adversaries’ disinformation.”
Interestingly, the report said that the IDF attempted this kind of rapid response, and even got ahead of itself when the IDF Spokesman’s Department rushed out what turned out to be a false account of the Golani Brigade in one major incident where it mistakenly killed aid workers in April 2025.
In contrast, the experience of The Jerusalem Post during the war has been that, except for half a dozen or so incidents where the IDF responded with speed, the IDF generally responded at a snail’s pace to the vast majority of hundreds of incidents reported by the media.
Communicating with the public on multiple levels
Next, the report said that responding fast with one message is insufficient.
Rather, Fox stated, “Western militaries must communicate on multiple levels: with factual briefings for analytical audiences, human-centered storytelling for the general public, and possibly entirely different framing for various cultural contexts.”
He also warned, “The Gaza war has also revealed new information warfare techniques, such as widespread use of visual propaganda and deepfakes. Hamas has repeatedly used fabricated images and audio, repurposing victim photos from other conflicts, like Syria, to influence public opinion.”
“Western forces should invest in counter-disinformation capabilities, both to quickly debunk false content (such as having open-source intelligence (OSINT) teams ready to perform image forensics on viral photos) and to broadcast authentic content to drown out fakes,” he cautioned.
Moreover, he stated, “If a media agency reports a number of casualties, the military cannot simply say ‘not true’ without evidence; it needs to either provide its own data or work with that agency to reconcile differences.”
In contrast, in the vast majority of hundreds of incidents of alleged war crimes reported by the global media, Israel has still not given a detailed response to specific incidents more than two years after the start of the war and months after the ceasefire kicked in.
Fox acknowledged that providing rapid responses “can be exceptionally difficult in the social media age, and may be impossible. Either way, it highlights the challenges of messaging in modern warfare. In Gaza, the absence of independent verification on the ground has made the information war even murkier, as demonstrated by disputes over casualty numbers.”
Besides media and legitimacy issues, the report covers a number of other military strategic and tactical issues.
According to the report, “The fighting highlighted the revolutionary role of drones and armored engineering vehicles, the importance of integrating special forces with conventional units and the critical need to protect civilians while managing the information narrative.”
In addition, Fox warned, “Key differences in Israel’s context, from rules of engagement and strategic culture to an adversary lacking advanced weapons or a significant drone threat, mean not all IDF methods can be directly applied by Western forces.”
He stated, “Western militaries must carefully assess which lessons from Gaza are transferable to their doctrine and which require adaptation to suit future adversaries. Whilst the remarkable technological transformation of the Ukrainian battlefield has garnered the headlines, Western armies cannot assume that the Ukrainian experience is now the only valid data point on the spectrum of conflict.
“The war in Gaza provides ample lessons for future conflicts in urban environments against non-state actors,” he added.
On another front, he said that “New command arrangements, such as a dedicated engineering headquarters for subterranean operations, were established mid-conflict. Likewise, combined-arms practices evolved as lessons from the battlefield were learned, re-learned, quickly absorbed, and shared.”
The report reflected positively that, “Every division has its own lessons-learned cell, mirrored by branch-specific cells in branches such as the Armored Corps and infantry, all contributing to regular conferences and senior staff processes. This multi-layered system has provided the IDF with an unusually swift response, allowing tactical and organizational innovation at a pace few Western militaries can currently match.”
Regarding the subterranean threat, Fox wrote, “Gaza’s battlefield featured extensive Hamas tunnel networks and fortified buildings, which the IDF addressed with specialized engineering units and heavy armored bulldozers.”
“These proved crucial for breaching walls, clearing rubble and demolishing tunnel entrances, which are tasks that standard infantry or armor would find challenging,” stated the report.
Next, the report stated that the “IDF is at ease with granting lower-echelon leaders the freedom to solve problems as they see fit. In practice, this meant tactics and techniques not anticipated before the war were rapidly validated and institutionalized during it. This agility to transform in contact has provided Israel with an advantage over its adversaries.”
Discussing tactical issues in the deployment of tanks and infantry in an age where Israeli tanks often had automatic defense mechanisms against rocket-propelled grenade ambushes, the report stated, “once kinetic APS [active protection systems] neutralizes the stand-off missile threat, the danger shifts to close-range attacks.
“Infantry were therefore repositioned to operate within a tight bubble around tanks, within a 100-metre radius, transforming their role and integration. The result was a far more effective team, with infantry and armor working closely together in mutually protective proximity,” the report said.
Yet another lesson was regarding the IDF’s unique use of Special Operations Forces (SOF).
According to the report, SOF units “were adapted into high-tempo reconnaissance and raiding teams within urban combat. Instead of being restricted to isolated covert missions, SOF functioned as a core part of the combined-arms system, using their agility to create tempo and gather intelligence during urban fighting.”
“This approach challenges Western ideas about the limited or niche roles of SOF in conventional campaigns,” added the report.
Moreover, Fox wrote that, “The widespread use of drones for reconnaissance and strikes by both sides offers a glimpse of future conflicts. Many, but not all, infantry platoons in Gaza had access to quadcopter drones or loitering munitions, fundamentally transforming how battles are fought street by street.’
Fox stated that small drones “provided IDF units with immediate ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] over rooftops and around corners, enabling precise engagements without waiting for air support.”