“We scored 100 and even answered a few bonus questions,” Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar said in an interview with The Jerusalem Post, describing the success of Operation Rising Lion, the war against Iran.
“That means we met all our objectives and then some, and the operation ended relatively quickly,” he said. “Yes, there was a painful human cost, but it was significantly lower than we were told to expect.”
People don’t always understand that the success was not only in striking Iran’s nuclear facilities but also in eliminating key individuals who held critical knowledge in weaponization, the process of converting enriched uranium into a nuclear bomb, Sa’ar said. “Those two elements – the infrastructure and the brains – were both targeted and neutralized in the opening strike.”
“This operation will be studied in military academies,” he said. “You launch a mission against a country 1,500 kilometers away, eliminate its chief of staff, and then four days later, you eliminate his replacement – it’s beyond imagination, and I hear the astonishment even from my international counterparts.
The critical hours before the strike
Speaking about the night of June 12-13, when the airstrike against Iran took place, Sa’ar said: “On the night between Thursday and Friday, everyone involved in the decision-making was deeply concerned.
Iranians had picked up on some signals in the days before; activity was increasing. There was also concern that Iran might launch a preemptive strike, especially after the US began evacuating its bases.”
“The success of the mission hinged on the opening strike, which was designed to disrupt command and control by taking out their military leadership,” he said. “In the end, that strategy worked, and it delayed their ability to retaliate against Israel.”
Sa’ar, a member of the security cabinet, also sat in the select “Group of Seven” forum led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and composed of just a few ministers, which planned the Iranian strike in the months leading up to the war.
“The circle of those in the know was very small,” he said. “Even within the Foreign Ministry, where a strategic information campaign had to begin immediately after the strike, only six or seven people knew it was going to happen that night.”
A shift to an ambitious strategy
“The operational plan evolved and expanded over time,” Sa’ar said. “It became much more ambitious. It’s not that the original concept was modest, but as we prepared, the thinking became: ‘Go all in.’
“This wasn’t just another air raid. It was a multiday operation, with repeated strike waves, targeting a country 75 times the size of Israel. The objective was to hit the nuclear program, the missile infrastructure, and key figures in both.”
The timing of the strike was chosen to maximize international legitimacy,” Sa’ar said.
This followed the collapse of negotiations between the Trump administration and Iran after Tehran refused to halt uranium enrichment, he said. It also coincided with discussions at the International Atomic Energy Agency, which had determined that the Islamic Republic was in violation of its nuclear commitments and raised suspicions that it was inching closer to nuclear weaponization.
Beyond the military planning, there were also diplomatic scenarios being modeled, Sa’ar said.
“We prepared for global reactions and divided responsibilities between me and the prime minister – who speaks to whom, and when,” he said.
During the 12-day operation, Sa’ar said, he spoke with foreign ministers from Europe and China who had opposed the mission.
“From an international perspective, Israel received unprecedented legitimacy,” he said. “In Europe, officials are relieved by the results, since they were deeply worried about Iran’s missile program. Publicly, they were cautious and denied involvement to protect themselves, but privately, I have no doubt they’re pleased. As the German chancellor said: ‘You did the dirty work for us.’”
The US role
Although US President Donald Trump ultimately approved the airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, Sa’ar revealed that for months leading up to the operation, it was unclear whether the US would give the green light.
“There were points when we feared the Americans would slam the brakes,” he said. “Trump preferred a diplomatic deal. But over time, it became evident that Iran’s idea of a deal, one that allowed them to retain enrichment capabilities, was completely different from the American vision.”
Even if Democratic Party candidate and former vice president Kamala Harris had won the 2024 election instead of Trump, Israel would have still seriously considered a military option “given the circumstances on the ground,” Sa’ar said. “That’s why I said back then that 2025 would be a decisive year for the nuclear issue, and so it was.”
“When we launched the attack two weeks ago, we didn’t know the US would join,” he said.
“That decision came mid-operation. We initiated the mission assuming we would act alone. I’m glad it developed into the perfect scenario, because US participation wasn’t just tactical; it sent a strategic message about Iran’s nuclear program, and that message will resonate going forward.”
Regime change? Not the goal
Asked why Israel did not aim to topple the Iranian regime, Sa’ar said: “That was never one of the goals, and there was broad consensus that it shouldn’t be. And anyway, can a regime be overthrown through airstrikes in a limited 12-day campaign?
“Is wartime even the right moment? Often, a nation rallies around its leadership during conflict. Had we declared regime change as a goal, it would’ve turned the war into an open-ended campaign dependent on internal Iranian dynamics. You can support change, but at the end of the day, it’s up to the Iranian people. Revolutions, after all, sometimes happen in a single day.”
Nevertheless, Sa’ar said he believes the regime may have suffered a significant blow.
“This regime is built on the perception of strength, both externally and internally,” he said. “That perception has taken a major hit over the past two weeks, and that could have serious implications.”
Regarding whether Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is a legitimate target, Sa’ar said: “I have an opinion, but I decided not to turn it into a headline during the war,” citing other Israeli officials who publicly called for Khamenei’s assassination. “We don’t need to announce in advance who we’re targeting. In matters like these, actions should speak louder than words.”
What's next?
Even after the operation, Israel is continuing its diplomatic campaign to isolate and weaken Iran, Sa’ar said.
“I’m speaking with the foreign ministers of Germany, Britain, and France – the parties to the nuclear deal – about activating the snapback mechanism, which would reimpose a wide range of sanctions on Iran,” he said.
“There’s still a desire in the international community to reach an agreement with Iran, but under different terms. There’s also concern that Iran might try to smuggle enriched uranium from damaged facilities to other locations. The world is trying to prevent that.”
“Iran remains committed to its twin goals: destroying Israel and acquiring nuclear weapons,” Sa’ar said. “We hit their program hard, but we must remain vigilant.”
Asked whether another round of conflict with Iran might be inevitable, he said: “I don’t rule anything out. You can’t. Our responsibility is to ensure Israel’s future, and you can’t secure that future with a nuclear Iran.”
Gaza and the hostages dilemma
Since the operation’s end, debate within the security cabinet has focused on whether to resume heavy fighting in Gaza to defeat Hamas and secure the release of all hostages, or to pursue the proposed deal for 10 hostages in exchange for a two-month ceasefire.
“It’s much easier to pursue the existing Witkoff framework and reach an agreement,” Sa’ar told the Post. “That 60-day ceasefire opens up space for negotiations on a permanent truce. Right now, I still think that’s the most realistic path: Secure a hostage deal, and during the pause, discuss the broader terms for ending the war. I truly hope we achieve that. It’s important.”
During the war with Iran, the chances for a Gaza deal were slim, Sa’ar said.
“Hamas believed the war might spiral into a wider regional conflict,” he said. “The January deal only came together after Hezbollah stayed out, Sinwar was killed, Assad’s regime collapsed, and Hamas found itself isolated. I believe we’re seeing a similar scenario now, and that increases the chances of reaching a deal.”