Iran has witnessed at least five major protest movements over the past two decades, most of them driven by economic grievances. In September 2022, protests erupted in the wake of the killing of Mahsa Amini, detained for allegedly violating the country’s hijab regulations. Known as the Hijab Protest, it evolved into a nationwide uprising – and resulted in an estimated 500 deaths and tens of thousands of arrests.
The current protests differ sharply from earlier waves of unrest, however. They have drawn in a far broader cross‑section of society, such as merchants, young people, and rural communities, and have spread well beyond Tehran into cities and villages across the country.
The Islamic government’s reaction has also been comparatively restrained, although there are rumors of over 2,000 killed throughout the country.
Notably, in a speech on the third day of the demonstrations, the Iranian president told protesters that the government itself, not the United States, was the answer to their grievances – a tone and message that marked a significant departure from previous official rhetoric.
For the protest to gain real momentum and a chance at eventual success, two elements are still missing: a unifying leader capable of challenging the regime and offering a credible alternative, and visible defections from within the state’s own power structures.
As long as the movement remains leaderless on the ground, its ability to coordinate and sustain pressure is limited. Only when members of the Basij or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) begin to break ranks and side with demonstrators will there be clear evidence of fractures in the regime’s stability.
Between revolution and war
The protests erupted just as Iran, Israel, and the West were already locked in an escalating war of words marked by mutual threats and open talk of conflict. Intelligence assessments pointed to renewed or attempted ballistic missile production and efforts to restore capabilities damaged during the 12-Day War in June.
In parallel, both President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu declared that they would block Iran from obtaining ballistic capabilities, even if it required another strike.
All of this unfolded before the protests had fully begun or while they were still in their earliest stages. Currently, the cries of war have been overtaken by the cries of protest. Nevertheless, the underlying threat has not disappeared and may even have grown.
As the regime feels increasing pressure from its own population, the possibility of a missile strike on Israel cannot be dismissed. However, launching a war amid domestic unrest could prove disastrous for Tehran, potentially giving the protests even greater momentum.
Under these conditions, Israel must deepen its intelligence understanding of developments inside Iran, reinforce its offensive capabilities, and ensure full defensive readiness in the event of an unexpected missile barrage from Iran.
The political leadership that flirted with the notion of toppling the Iranian regime during the 12‑Day War – and assumed, mistakenly and utterly unfoundedly, that eliminating its leader would bring about regime change – must now restrain the inflammatory rhetoric and refrain from releasing provocative propaganda videos, such as the one circulated by Israeli Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel.
Israel should avoid becoming a party that appears to interfere in Iran’s internal unrest.
President Trump has stated that the United States would support protesters if the regime began killing them, though his declaration does not realistically imply American troops landing in Tehran – especially given his consistent reluctance to deploy US forces to global conflicts. Nonetheless, Israel would be ill-advised to make similar statements.
The rise of the protests has not removed the possibility of Israel having to confront a war or military escalation with Iran. At most, it has delayed it. If a confrontation does occur, the nature of the Iranian state that emerges after the unrest will heavily shape its capabilities, its willingness to engage, and the character of any future clash with Israel. What existed before is not necessarily what will follow.
In case of war
After considering the key questions surrounding the protests – their prospects for success and the steps Israel should or should not take – it remains clear that the risk of escalation to a full‑scale war with Iran persists, whichever side triggers it.
And what would another war with Iran look like? To begin with, we should avoid the terminology used for conflicts with Hamas or Hezbollah; this would not be a “round” but a full‑scale war.
Even before any effort to rebuild its missile array, Iran retained enough missiles after the war in June to pose a serious challenge to Israel. Its missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities were the only systems that performed reliably during that conflict, and there is little doubt that Iran is now studying its shortcomings and drawing lessons.
In any future confrontation, we are likely to face a more formidable threat: larger salvos, the continued ability to fire dozens of missiles in a single burst, and launches dispersed across a wider geographic “fan pattern” that could complicate Israel’s defensive response.
There is little doubt that if Iran or Israel initiates a war, the opening phase will involve several intense days of reciprocal missile fire, placing the Israeli home front and critical infrastructure under severe strain.
Such a scenario would test the country’s ability to maintain operational continuity, deliver emergency services, and limit casualties and damage, especially to essential systems, to avoid a repeat of incidents like the one at Soroka Medical Center in Beersheba.
Israel must absorb the lessons of the previous conflict and prepare for the next, which will differ in character and begin from the point at which the last one ended.
The writer is a retired Brigadier-General and former Israel Air Force commander.