When Sanae Takaichi won Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party leadership earlier this month, she shattered a political ceiling that had held since 1947. As Japan’s first female prime minister-in-waiting and a hardline conservative she inherits the world’s fourth-largest economy at a moment of inflation, coalition fatigue, and rising military tensions across the Indo-Pacific. Her election is more than a gender milestone: it could redefine Japan’s strategic posture for the next decade.
Takaichi succeeds Shigeru Ishiba, whose resignation ended months of political stagnation after the LDP’s electoral losses. Unlike Ishiba’s cautious centrism, Takaichi embodies ideological clarity, characterized by nationalism, defense buildup, and a conviction that Japan must act first in its own interests while preserving alliances on an equal footing. Her mantra, borrowed from Margaret Thatcher is simple: “Work, work, and work.”
From pacifism to deterrence
Takaichi’s rise accelerates Japan’s gradual shift away from its postwar pacifism-a process begun under her mentor, the late Shinzo Abe. Abe redefined Japan as a “proactive contributor to peace,” strengthening the Self-Defense Forces and establishing the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. Takaichi seems determined to continue that trajectory.
She advocates raising defense spending beyond 2 percent of GDP, expanding space, cyber, and missile-defense programs, and ensuring Japan’s ability to respond independently to regional threats. Her message is clear: deterrence today requires both technological superiority and military numbers. Japan, she argues, must protect its sovereignty through innovation and readiness.
Japan First, but not Japan Alone
While her “Japan First” rhetoric sounds nationalist, its logic is pragmatic. True autonomy, she believes, depends on coordination with other maritime democracies. Her foreign-policy compass remains anchored in the FOIP framework shared by India, Australia, and the United States through the Quad partnership.
For India, Takaichi’s premiership carries strategic weight. Tokyo and New Delhi have become the twin anchors of the Indo-Pacific’s democratic architecture—both wary of China’s assertiveness and committed to resilient supply chains and self-reliance in defense. Like Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Takaichi blends economic nationalism with strategic pragmatism. Both see the Indo-Pacific as a single continuum linking prosperity and security from the Arabian Sea to the western Pacific.
Under her leadership, Japan is expected to deepen cooperation with India in the eastern Indian Ocean, coordinate naval patrols, and expand joint research on surveillance, cyber defense, and undersea infrastructure protection. Tokyo may also lend stronger support to India’s India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC), a project that counters China’s Belt and Road expansion while connecting Asia, the Gulf, and Europe.
Washington under Trump 2.0
Takaichi enters office as President Donald Trump begins his second term-a scenario that injects volatility into every trade and defense equation. She values the US–Japan alliance as the cornerstone of national security but has criticized what she calls “unequal tariff deals” struck under previous governments. Her intention to review elements of the $550 billion investment framework signed last year signals a desire for parity, not rupture.
The diplomatic calculus is delicate: if she overplays economic nationalism, Japan risks friction with Washington; if she underplays it, she undermines her domestic legitimacy. The challenge will be to maintain trust with an unpredictable White House while ensuring Japan remains indispensable to America’s Asia strategy.
Risks of overreach
Takaichi’s hawkish instincts come with diplomatic hazards. Her past visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead, including controversial wartime figures could reignite historical disputes with China and South Korea. Her calls for stricter immigration controls and unapologetic remarks about Japan’s wartime legacy may strengthen her nationalist base but complicate regional diplomacy.
If she pushes constitutional reform too aggressively, public opinion still attached to postwar pacifism could turn sharply against her. And should the United States reduce its regional footprint while Japan adopts a confrontational stance toward Beijing, Tokyo could find itself strategically isolated.
Technology as strategy
Where Takaichi is most likely to excel is at the intersection of defense and technology the defining arena of the new strategic era. As a former minister for economic security, she helped establish Japan’s framework for safeguarding supply chains, semiconductors, and dual-use innovation. Her government is expected to expand investment in quantum computing, AI-driven defense systems, and space-based surveillance.
This creates a clear opening for Israel. A Japan that prioritizes innovation-driven security will find natural partners in Israel’s cyber and defense-tech ecosystem, as well as in joint ventures combining artificial intelligence, robotics, and maritime monitoring. Quiet trilateral cooperation among Japan, India, and Israel, each blending technological strength with strategic restraint could emerge as one of the Indo-Pacific’s most significant trends in the coming decade.
A new strategic identity still in formation
Sanae Takaichi’s ascent marks the consolidation of Japan’s transformation from a passive to an active security actor. She embodies the paradox of modern Japan: technologically advanced, normatively cautious, yet increasingly unwilling to rely on others for its defense. Yet much of her future policy remains unformulated and untested. Her electoral victory marks the beginning of a process, not its culmination. Whether Japan under her leadership will fully embrace this strategic transformation or hesitate in the face of domestic and regional constraints remains to be seen.
This moment should therefore be read not as an endpoint but as the next phase in Japan’s long evolution toward strategic normalization. If she succeeds, Japan will stand as a confident, innovation-driven democracy capable of deterring aggression and upholding order. If she fails, her tenure could expose the limits of Japan’s power projection in a region increasingly defined by competition and uncertainty.
Either way, her rise ensures that Japan is back not just as an economic power, but as a key architect of the Indo-Pacific’s security future.