The Abraham Accords were rightly celebrated as a diplomatic breakthrough. They brought normalization between Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, unlocking new avenues of trade, tourism, and investment. Yet the accords were never meant to end with bilateral gains alone.
They created a foundation for new multilateral frameworks – most notably I2U2, a grouping of India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States.
While India and the Emirates have already advanced their bilateral relationship in trade, energy, and technology, Israel has not fully capitalized on this emerging format.
Today, Jerusalem finds itself at a crossroads: it can remain a secondary player in a grouping it helped launch, or it can actively leverage I2U2 to cement its role in both the Middle East and the wider Indo-Pacific.
The promise and limits of the Abraham Accords
There is no doubt that the Abraham Accords have delivered concrete economic benefits. Trade between Israel and the UAE has surged from negligible levels to billions of dollars annually.
Emirati tourists became a visible presence in Tel Aviv, while Israeli technology companies opened offices in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Similar gains, though on a smaller scale, occurred with Bahrain and Morocco.
Politically, however, the results have been less impressive. The Palestinian question and the war in Gaza have limited how far normalization could extend. Regional powers such as Saudi Arabia remain cautious, conditioning any move toward Israel on progress in the peace process.
In this sense, the accords generated momentum in commerce but left the strategic map unchanged. For Israel, that means the promise of a transformed regional order has not yet materialized.
The rise of I2U2
Out of this context emerged I2U2, also known as the Middle Eastern Quad or Western Quad, first convened in 2021–22. Far from a ceremonial grouping, it was designed as a “minilateral” platform: smaller than traditional multilateral forums, but more agile and practical.
Its agenda spans green energy, food security, hi-tech innovation, infrastructure development, and defense cooperation.
For India and the UAE, the four-way strategic partnership came naturally. The two had already built deep commercial ties, from ports and logistics to renewable energy projects.
The United States, meanwhile, saw the forum as a way to connect its Middle Eastern and Indo-Pacific strategies. For Israel, the framework promised a chance to embed itself in a grouping that combined two of its closest partners with the world’s leading superpower.
Israel’s unique value
Israel brings distinctive assets to I2U2. Its reputation for cutting-edge innovation in defense, cyber, water management, and agri-tech is well established. These capabilities complement India’s industrial scale and the UAE’s financial power.
In theory, the grouping could pioneer joint projects that are more than the sum of their parts – for example, trilateral ventures in renewable energy, defense technology, or food security, where each partner contributes a unique strength.
Yet so far, Israel has not translated this potential into reality. Many of the most dynamic initiatives under I2U2 have been driven by the India–UAE axis, with Israel playing only a limited role. This imbalance risks leaving Jerusalem on the margins of a grouping it helped establish.
Events of the past two years – from the Gaza war and Houthi attacks to the May 2025 India–Pakistan confrontation – have only reinforced the urgency for India and its partners, particularly the US and Israel, to deepen defense-technology ties.
These overlapping crises have exposed vulnerabilities in supply chains, tested military readiness, and underscored the value of resilient partnerships. For both India and Israel, facing asymmetric threats and hostile neighbors, I2U2 offers a platform not of symbolism but of necessity.
Why Israel must act now
Recent crises have only highlighted the urgency of deeper cooperation.
The war in Gaza, the Houthi attacks linked to Iran, and India’s confrontation with Pakistan in May, all underscored the scale of the security challenges faced by Israel and India alike. Both democracies confront hostile neighbors, asymmetric threats, and regional instability that spill across borders.
I2U2 offers a platform to respond to these challenges collectively. Unlike the fragile political dimension of the Abraham Accords, the strategic partnership is interest-driven and functional. It is less about symbolism and more about concrete cooperation: building supply-chain resilience, investing in joint technology platforms, and coordinating responses to security disruptions.
For Israel, the forum is also a way to anchor itself in the Indo-Pacific, a region that accounts for over 60% of global GDP and is increasingly the theater of US–China rivalry. By aligning more closely with New Delhi and Abu Dhabi through I2U2, Jerusalem can ensure that it is not confined to the Middle Eastern periphery but is part of a wider strategic conversation.
The opportunity and the risk
The opportunity is clear: Israel can use I2U2 to showcase its technological assets, deepen its partnership with India, and position itself as an indispensable link between the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. Doing so would strengthen its hand vis-à-vis Iran, expand its economic reach, and enhance its relevance to Washington’s regional strategies.
The risk is equally clear: if Israel remains passive, the India–UAE partnership will continue to dominate the forum, relegating Jerusalem to a supporting role. This would squander the unique moment created by the Abraham Accords, leaving Israel with economic benefits but little strategic influence.
While the Abraham Accords opened the door to normalization, I2U2 is where Israel’s true strategic test lies. By embracing its role as an innovation powerhouse, Israel can turn the grouping into a functional mechanism that enhances security, resilience, and economic growth for all four partners.
India and the UAE are already moving forward. The United States views the forum as part of its broader Indo-Pacific approach. Israel, however, must do more – not only to safeguard its place in I2U2, but to ensure that the promise of the Abraham Accords extends beyond bilateral trade into the realm of genuine strategic transformation. If Jerusalem rises to this challenge, it will not only secure new opportunities with New Delhi and Abu Dhabi, but also stake its claim as a vital player in the evolving architecture of the Indo-Pacific.